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UNITED STATES V. HATAHLEY: A LEGAL




This article is a case study of United States v. Hatahley using the
methodology of "legal archaeology" to reconstruct the historical, social, and
economic context of the litigation. In 1953, a group of individual Navajos
brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the destruction of over one
hundred horses and burros. The first section of the article presents two
contrasting narratives for the case. The first relates what we know about the
case from the reported opinions, while the second locates the litigated case
within the larger social context by examining the parties, the history of
incidents culminating in the destruction of the Navajo horses, and the
litigation that preceded Hatahley.
The remainder of the article examines the role of racial conflict in various
aspects of the case. Part II looks at the problem of cross-cultural damages and
how the courts grappled with assigning money damages where the plaintiffs
live in a non-market-based society. Part III examines the intersection of race
and power, particularly the paradoxical role of law in both maintaining and
challenging racial hierarchies. Part IV examines the question ofjudicial bias
from a unique perspective. The case ultimately was assigned to another judge
due to the trial judge's alleged partiality in favor of the Navajos. The section
explores whether the lack of prejudice, when contrasted with a background
societal prejudice, could be read as partiality. The epilogue points out how
this question has a modem application.
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Introduction
What is needed here is . .. a responsible way ofpaying attention
to what is before us: to the social and cultural context of the text,
in as much fullness and detail as we can manage; to the "unsaid"
that can render a simple statement complex, or a superficially
complex one foolish; to the nature, in short, ofthe relation between
text and world.'
1. JAMES BOYD WHITE, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways ofReading, Ways of
Life, in HERACLEs' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 107, 122 (1985).
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In this article, I take up the challenge articulated by James Boyd White: to
find "a responsible way of paying attention" to the social and cultural context
of a reported opinion. The methodology of "legal archaeology"' provides
such a way. Legal archaeology is a type of legal history that takes the form
of a case study, reconstructing the historical, social, and economic context of
a litigated case.3
The case under examination in this article is United States v. Hatahley.4
The litigation was part of a long-running controversy between Navajo
herdsmen and white ranchers in San Juan County, Utah over access to public
grazing land. The event that triggered the litigation was the destruction of
over one hundred horses and burros belonging to the Navajos. The litigation
was protracted, lasting for nearly a decade and involving two trials, two
appeals to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, a United States Supreme Court
decision, and a mandamus proceeding before the case was finally settled in
1961.
2. The term was coined by Brian Simpson of the University of Michigan College of Law.
He explains the metaphor as follows:
[A] reported case does in some ways resemble those traces of past human
activity-crop marks, post holes, the footings of walls, pipe stems, pottery shards,
kitchen middens, and so forth, from which the archaeologist attempts, by
excavation, scientific testing, comparison, and analysis to reconstruct and make
sense of the past. Cases need to be treated as what they are, fragments of
antiquity, and we need, like archaeologists, gently to free these fragments from the
overburden of legal dogmatics, and try, by relating them to other evidence, which
has to be sought outside the law library, to make sense of them as events in history
and incidents in the evolution of the law.
A.W. BRIAN SIMPsoN, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 12 (1995). A few years ago I put
together a symposium on "Legal Archaeology" at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the
University of Utah. Inspired in part by this symposium, Foundation Press developed a series
called "Law Stories," which is at heart a compilation by subject matter of legal archaeology
projects. E-mail from Paul L. Caron, Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law, to
Debora L. Threedy, Professor, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah (Sept. 30, 2002)
(on file with author); see also Paul L. Caron, Tax Archaeology, in TAX STORIEs 1, 1 (Paul L.
Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009).
3. This call for context should be seen as a normative move. Normatively, the call for
context is a call to examine "social structures of power that extend far beyond the particularities
of a given situation." Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.
1597, 1605 (1990). These structures of power are built along the lines of race, gender, and
class. "The attention to particularity.. . is not an unthinking immersion in overwhelming detail,
but instead a sustained inquiry into the structures of domination in our society." Id. at 1633.
4. 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958).
3
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I have chosen to do an in-depth reconstruction of this case for several
reasons. First, I have selected it for what it is. The case has often been cited
for a number of propositions. The Supreme Court opinion has been cited the
most frequently, in more than two hundred lower-court opinions and nearly
one hundred secondary sources. It is cited mostly for issues arising under the
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Taylor Grazing Act.' The second Tenth
Circuit opinion, the last opinion in the case, has been cited much less often,
but has entered the "pedagogical canon" for what it says about damages.' It
currently appears as the first case in a leading Remedies casebook,' and in the
past it has appeared in the remedies section of a leading Civil Procedure
casebook.'
Conversely, another reason I have chosen to do a study of this case is
because of what it is not. Despite the centrality of race and Native American
rights to the case, it is not part of the Indian Law or Civil Rights Law canons.'
This omission is understandable because, looked at from a doctrinal
perspective, the case has little to say about Indian Law or Civil Rights.
Doctrinally, the case involves torts, remedies, and civil procedure.
Nevertheless, this omission is regrettable because the case presents a window
into a fascinating and complex moment in the history of race relations in this
country."o In the post-World War II era, civil rights for minorities was a
paramount issue. Historically, the focus when examining that era has been
5. E.g., United States v. Shenise, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1193-95 (D. Colo. 1999). The
terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-2680
(2006). The provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act are contained in 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r
(2006).
6. The "pedagogical canon" refers to those key cases that are taught in law school classes
and reprinted in casebooks. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Canons: An Introduction,
in LEGAL CANONS 3, 7 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000).
7. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (3d ed.
2002).
8. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDuRE 315 (5th ed. 2000).
9. Randall Kennedy has suggested that the law school curricular canon should include "a
course that investigates the ways in which race relations have affected and been affected by legal
institutions." Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law in the Canon ofLegalAcademia, in LEGAL
CANONS, supra note 6, at 211, 211.
10. "[R]ace is a central and generative feature of the American legal canon, but ... its role
and significance have too often been obscured or written out of the conventional wisdom
transmitted through American legal education and scholarship." Fran Ansley, Recognizing Race
in the American Legal Canon, in LEGAL CANONS, supra note 6, at 238, 241.
[Vol. 344
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primarily on race relations between blacks and whites; less attention has been
paid to race relations between Native Americans and whites."
The Hatahley case involves this latter racial conflict. Moreover, it is an
utterly enthralling and practically unknown story and one that deserves to be
better known. The case has much to teach us about how societal racism
infects, in indirect and subtle ways as well as in obvious ways, the
administration ofjustice. At the same time, the case shows that law can be a
tool, albeit a flawed and compromised one, in the fight to combat injustice
arising from that racism.
The first section of the paper presents two contrasting narratives of the
case. The first is in the nature of a traditional case brief and examines what
we know about the case from the reported opinions. The second, more
detailed narrative 2 locates the litigated case within the larger social context
by examining the three parties involved (the Montezuma Creek Navajos, the
San Juan County ranchers, and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM)),
the history of incidents culminating in the destruction of the Navajo horses
and burros, and the litigation preceding Hatahley.
Conflict between Native Americans and Anglo society is implicated in
every aspect of the case. In the remainder of the article, I examine different
portions of the case through this lens. In Part II, I look at the problem of
cross-cultural damages: the problems oftranslation that arise when one culture
(the Navajos) turns to another, disparate culture for redress. These problems
oftranslation include more than language barriers, although such barriers were
a problem in the case. The more basic problem, however, was how to
translate value from a communal, non-market society to one that is market-
based. I argue that, whatever flaws may exist in the trial judge's computation
11. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 222 (arguing that race-relations law is dominated by black-
white conflicts, that "[w]hite-red racial conflict" has been segregated "under the rubric of
federal Indian law[,]" resulting in such conflict being isolated outside of the major currents of
legal academia, and that such "isolation" of white-red racial conflict "ought to be reconsidered
and undone").
12. This second narrative is a kind of "counernarrative":
[L]egal academics, in their roles as teachers, scholars, and public intellectuals,
should challenge the grand racial narratives and "grand racial silences" of the
official canon,... they should help to resurrect and construct countemarratives,
in important part by attending to the experiences and words of those who can offer
perspectives from the bottom and from the margins of the racial order as it is
currently constituted.
Ansley, supra note 10, at 241.
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of damages, he was more sensitive to this basic problem than was the
appellate court.
In Part III, I take a pragmatic perspective and look at how racialized power
structures in the legal system "stacked the deck" against the Navajos, but did
not shut them out completely. I examine how the Navajos manage to turn one
of those tools of power, the law, to their own ends. Finally, I investigate the
consequences of that move, both within and without the litigation, and pose
the question of whether this was a successful strategy in this case.
In Part IV, I look at the issue of judicial partiality and ask whether the
record supports the charge that the trial judge was biased in favor of the
Navajos. The sensitivity of the trial judge in this case to the lived realities of
the plaintiffs' situation raises the question of what constitutes impartiality in
a society tainted by prejudice. In other words, I explore whether his lack of
prejudice in a society that was prejudiced against the Navajos, which is in fact
impartiality, could appear to others as partiality.
Finally, the article concludes with an epilogue that draws striking parallels
between Hatahley (a 1950s case) and current litigation challenging the
government's administration of Indian trust funds.
I. Contrasting Narratives
[W]e as researchers construct that which we claim to find'3
In this section, I present two contrasting narratives for Hatahley. The first
is the official narrative that has been preserved in the official case reports.
The other is the unofficial "back story"l4 that seeks to explain how the account
preserved in the judicial opinions came to be. This is the narrative that has
been "excavated" by the methodology of legal archaeology. Read together,
these two provide a fuller narrative of the case than if one read only the
appellate opinions.
A. The Official Account of the Case
Hatahley v. United States, on its face, involves a controversy between the
BLM and a band of Navajos. The Navajos brought suit against the BLM
13. Elizabeth Mytton, Lived Experiences ofthe Law Teacher, 37 LAWTCHR. 36,43 (2003)
(quoting Frederick Steier, Introduction: Research as Self-Reflexivity, Self-Reflexivity in Social
Process, in RESEARCH AND REFLExIVYTY (Frederick Steier ed., 1991)).
14. In narratology, the "back story" is the exposition in a work that brings the reader up to
the present time of the story. See Back-story, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Back story (last
visited Feb. 1, 2010).
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under the Federal Tort Claims Act," alleging that 115 horses and 35 burros
belonging to them were unlawfully seized and destroyed by the BLM in 1952
and 1953." The undisputed trial evidence was that the BLM, sometimes
assisted by local ranchers, rounded up the horses and burros herd-by-herd and
drove or trucked them to a nearby town, where they were held for a short
time." The animals were then loaded on trucks and shipped to the Kuhni
Packing Plant outside Provo, in northern Utah, where they were rendered into
by-products.'" The stock was sold for no more than three cents per pound, for
a total amount of $1700, which was paid to the Grazing District Advisory
Board, made up of local ranchers." The BLM asserted that the authority for
doing this could be found in the Utah "Abandoned Horse" statute.20
Procedurally, the case was lengthy and involved, spanning eight years, two
trials, two trips to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, one to the United States
Supreme Court, and a mandamus proceeding. In the original trial, the lower
court held in favor of the Navajos and awarded them the amount prayed for
in the complaint, $100,000 as damages. 2 1 The Tenth Circuit reversed on the
issue of liability without considering damages.22 The case then went up to the
United States Supreme Court.23 The Supreme Court found that the BLM was
liable for killing the horses and burros, but remanded for specific findings as
to damages.24 The significance of this decision is that "reportedly it was the
15. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-2680 (2006).
16. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley 1), 220 F.2d 666, 667-69 (10th Cir. 1955), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 351 U.S. 173 (1956). This was not the first time these Navajos had
suffered such a loss. A generation before, in the winter of 1931-1932, some seventy horses
belonging to the Montezuma Creek Navajos were killed. David M. Brugge, Navajo Use and
Occupation of Lands North of the San Juan River in Present-Day Utah to 1935, at 196 (Aug.
1966) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the American Indian Law Review).
17. Hatahley I, 220 F.2d at 669.
18. Reporter's Transcript of Testimony and Proceedings at 130, 467, Hatahley v. United
States, No. C-36-53 (D. Utah Jan. 22, 1954) [hereinafter First Trial Transcript].
19. Hatahley I, 220 F.2d at 669, 672 n.2.
20. UTAH CODE ANN. § 47-2-3 (West 2004). State law defined an "abandoned horse" as
one that was unbranded or for which taxes had not been paid in the preceding year. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 47-2-1 (West 1953).
21. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley I1), 257 F.2d 920, 921 (10th Cir. 1958).
22. Hatahley I, 220 F.2d at 672. The Tenth Circuit held that the Taylor Grazing Act
permitted the BLM to follow state procedures in this case. Id. at 667.
23. Hatahley II, 257 F.2d at 922.
24. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181-82 (1956). The Supreme Court held that
"the Utah abandoned horse statute was not properly invoked" and that the BLM was required
to follow the notice provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act, which it failed to do. Id.
Interestingly, a very similar situation recently played out in Nevada. The BLM impounded and
7
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first time American Indians had successfully sued the government for
intentional wrongdoing."25
On remand from the Supreme Court, another trial was held on the issue of
damages before the judge who had heard the original trial, Willis Ritter, and
he entered judgment in the amount of $186,017.50, from which the
government again appealed.2 6 The Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment and
again remanded for a new trial on the damages issue." The Tenth Circuit also
suggested that the case be assigned to a new judge because the original judge
was biased in favor of the Navajos.28
Judge Ritter ignored this suggestion. 29 His answer to the government's
application for a special master to determine damages was that he did not
intend to follow the Tenth Circuit's suggestion that he step down, "so you can
lay that to one side."30 The government then applied to the Tenth Circuit for
the entry of a judgment on the mandate prohibiting Ritter from retrying the
case a third time." The Tenth Circuit ordered that Ritter "take no further
action" in the case.32 Because at that time the U.S. District Court for the
District of Utah had only a single sitting judge (Ritter), the Chief Judge for the
Tenth Circuit, Alfred P. Murrah, assigned the case to Judge Ewing T. Kerr,
U.S. District Judge for the District of Wyoming."
A little over a year later, the case settled. The Navajo plaintiffs received
$45,000 before deduction of attorneys fees, less than half the amount awarded
them at the first trial ($100,000) and less than a quarter of what they had been
awarded at the second trial ($186,017.50).34
sold at auction 232 cattle seized from Western Shoshone tribal members Carrie and Mary Dann,
who had refused to pay grazing fees, insisting that the Western Shoshones have a treaty right
to the land. See, e.g., Scott Sonner, Federal Government Sells Seized Cattle AmidDispute over
Tribal Rights, NEV. APPEAL (Carson City, Nev.), Oct. 5, 2002, at Al.
25. Nancy C. Maryboy & David Begay, The Navajos of Utah, in A HISTORY OF UTAH'S
AMERICAN INDIANS 265, 301 (Forrest S. Cuch ed., 2000).
26. Hatahley II, 257 F.2d at 922.
27. Id. at 926.
28. Id. at 925-26. I admit it was this passage that first piqued my interest in this case.
29. United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 31. Ritter did not respond either in person or by counsel, but counsel for the
plaintiffs opposed the application. Id.
32. Id. at 32.
33. Designation of District Judge for Service in Another District Within His Circuit (10th
Cir. Dec. 7, 1959) (contained in Judge Willis Ritter Papers, Special Collections, Marriott
Library, University of Utah, Box 76, Folder "Hatahley Papers").
34. Stipulation for Compromise and Settlement and Order Approving Same at 4, Hatahley
[Vol. 348
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B. The Unofficial Story: The Back Story of the Case
The Hatahley case, particularly the second Tenth Circuit opinion, has
entered the academic canon for its treatment of the issues surrounding the
determination of damages.3 s The case can be read solely for what it has to say
about damages, but I am suggesting that the case is more interesting and more
valuable if the damages issue is located within a fuller understanding of the
underlying controversy.
Although the lawsuit was technically about compensation for the illegal
destruction of Navajo horses and burros, the real fight was about land. The
roundup of the horses was not the first time that tensions had erupted, nor
would it be the last. Indeed, in a sense the fight continues to this day. To
understand the underlying controversy, we have to step back, look at the
bigger picture, and understand a bit of the history of this place and the people
who live there. The controversy at heart is about the clash of races and
cultures. It is this clash that made the damages issue such a difficult one to
resolve.
To fully understand the cultural clash it is necessary to know the historical
context in which the case arose. That context is exceptionally complex. It
involves a time and a place that witnessed a struggle between three separate
"cultures," and it came loaded with the "baggage" of more than one hundred
years of inter-cultural and racial struggle. Moreover, it involves a struggle
that is not well-known.
The physical locus of this struggle is the southeastern portion of the state
of Utah,36 where San Juan County abuts the "Four Corners," the shared corner
of four states: Utah, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico." San Juan County
was "formed in 1880, before it had any white population."" The county is
v. United States, No. C-36-53 (D. Utah Apr. 11, 1961).
35. See LAYCOCK, supra note 7, at 11; YEAZELL, supra note 8, at 315.
36. In informal discussions with other academics, I have discovered that some erroneously
assume that, because the case involved Navajos, it must have arisen in Arizona. Although the
largest part of the Navajo Reservation does lie within Arizona, portions of the Reservation
extend into Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah. As will be discussed below, the fact that the
Navajo plaintiffs resided in Utah is significant to the controversy.
37. ROBERT S. MCPHERSON, A HISTORY OF SAN JUAN COUNTY: IN THE PALM OF TiME 8
(1995) [hereinafter MCPHERSON, HISTORY]. San Juan County is home to part of Monument
Valley, most of Canyonlands National Park, portions of Lake Powell and Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area, and three National Monuments (Rainbow Bridge, Natural Bridges, and
Hovenweep), as well as a portion of the Navajo Reservation.
38. WALLACE STEGNER, THE SOUND OF MOUNTAIN WATER 103 (Penguin Books 1997)
9
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large, "a trifle smaller than Massachusetts, a little bigger than Rhode Island,
Connecticut, and Delaware combined."3
More specifically, the locus of this case centered on an area north of the
San Juan River: Montezuma Canyon and the mesas to the west, McCracken
Mesa, and Alkali Ridge. The area extends some fifteen miles from north to
south and eighty miles from east to west.40 Today, a good chunk of the area
is part of the Navajo Reservation. Prior to 1958, however, the places relevant
to the lawsuit were not part of the reservation.
1. The Stake Holders
The three cultures that were struggling to co-exist in this place were (1) a
band of Navajos, sometimes called the Montezuma Creek Band or the
Kaiyellis,4 1 who then and now hold themselves apart from the main portion of
the Navajo Tribe, (2) the local ranching community, which was and is
overwhelmingly comprised of members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (the LDS Church, whose members are often called
Mormons), and (3) the emerging regulator of the rangelands, the newly
reorganized BLM.
a) The Montezuma Creek Navajos
Most people associate the Navajos with Arizona and New Mexico. What
many people do not realize is that a portion of the Navajo reservation extends
into Utah and that Utah has a significant population of Navajos. The Utah
reservation land and most of Utah's Navajos are located in San Juan County
in the very southeastern corner of the state. At this time, the reservation
occupies one-quarter of the county's land,42 and the Navajos comprise about
(1969).
39. Id.
40. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5, Hatahley v. United States, No. C-36-53
(D. Utah Apr. 5, 1957) [hereinafter Findings (1957)].
41. STEPHEN TRIMBLE, THE PEOPLE: INDIANS OF THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 183 (1993)
(noting many Utah Navajos call themselves Kaiyellis, "after the nineteenth-century Bears Ears
headman, K'aayeli"). Many, if not all, of the Hatahley plaintiffs are descended from K'aayeli
and his sisters or are related to someone who is. See, e.g., Interview with Rose Sakizzie,
Member, Navajo Tribe, in Blanding, Utah (Oct. 6,2000); Interview with James Eddie, Member,
Navajo Tribe, on the Navajo Reservation, San Juan County, Utah (Sept. 16, 2000); Interview
with Mary Jay, Member, Navajo Tribe, on the Navajo Reservation, San Juan County, Utah
(Sept. 16, 2000).
42. San Juan County, the largest county in the state of Utah, comprises 7725 square miles.
San Juan County Area, http://onlineutah.com/sanjuancountyarea.shtml (last visited Feb. 3,
10 [Vol. 34
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fifty-two percent of San Juan County's population.4 3 In the 1940s, the total
population of the county was under 5000, and approximately one-third of
those were Native Americans."
It must be emphasized that the plaintiff in this case is not the Navajo Tribe
itself. The plaintiffs were a small group ofNavajos living in the Montezuma
Creek" area of San Juan County, north of the San Juan River. As best as I can
determine, they seem to have been interrelated by blood, marriage, and clan.46
The decision to bring this lawsuit and the initial financing of the litigation
were made by the individual plaintiffs."7 Indeed, the relationship between this
group of Navajos and the Navajo Tribe was and continues to be somewhat
problematic.48
If the world worked the way it is supposed to, this group of Montezuma
Creek Navajos would long ago have been recognized as a separate band,
perhaps with their own reservation.49 There are actually four geographically
separate Navajo reservations: the main portion (which occupies a large chunk
of Arizona and New Mexico as well as a part of Utah)so and the Ramah,
2010). The Utah portion of the Navajo Reservation comprises 1,155,000 acres, or just over
1800 square miles. Robert S. McPherson, Navajo Indians, http://onlineutah.com/navajohistory.
shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). San Juan County encompasses the entirety of the Navajo
Reservation in Utah.
43. ROBERT S. MCPHERSON, NAVAJO LAND, NAvAJO CULTURE: THE UTAH EXPERIENCE IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 228 (2001) [hereinafter MCPHERSON, NAvAJO LAND]. As of 1993,
some 6000 Navajos lived in San Juan County. That number represents only three percent of the
entire Navajo population. TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 182.
44. STEGNER, supra note 38, at 103.
45. Supposedly, Montezuma Creek received its name due to a legend that Montezuma, the
Aztec leader defeated by Hernando Cortez, escaped to this area, was later recaptured, and then
killed at this creek. MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 21. A similar legend is assertedly
the basis for the names of Recapture Creek and the nearby town of Cortez, Colorado. Id.
46. There are at present time sixty Navajo clans. TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 123. The clan
is the organizing principle of Navajo society.
47. Interview with Mary Jay, supra note 41.
48. See, e.g., Richard J. Ansson, Jr., The Navajo Nation's Aneth Extension and the Utah
Navajo Trust Fund: Who Should Govern the Fund After Years ofMisuse?, 14 T.M. COOLEY L.
REv. 555, 577, 595 (1997).
49. Cf id. at 575-77, 585, 589-93, 595-96 (describing the friction between the Utah
Navajos and the tribe as a whole); TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 183 (quoting Mark Maryboy, a
Navajo and former San Juan County Commissioner: "Utah Navajos live in no-man's land. The
Navajo Tribe ignores them; the state of Utah ignores them. Each thinks the other is taking care
of them.").
50. Map of the Navajo Nation, http://www.lapahie.com/NavajoMapLg.cfim (last visited
Feb. 11, 2010) (depicting a map of the Navajo Reservation). The main portion of the
reservation is often referred to as the "rez." See TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 154.
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Cafioncito, and Alamo Navajo Reservations (which are all much smaller and
all located in New Mexico.)" The existence of these separate Navajo bands
and reservations is a consequence of events in the history of the Navajo
people. Analogous events shaped the separate identity of the Montezuma
Creek Navajos, even if legally they have not been so recognized.
The experiences of the Montezuma Creek Navajos differ in significant
respects from that of the main body of the tribe. The presence of Navajos in
this area does not date back as far as in parts of Arizona and New Mexico,
probably because the area has always been on the fringes of Navajoland.52
The earliest Utah Navajo site "north of the San Juan River is a hogan in the
White Canyon area west of Bear's Ears . . . probably built about 1620,"s3
whereas archaeologists date the presence ofNavaj os in northern New Mexico
back at least one hundred years earlier.
Most significantly for their sense of self-identity, in the 1860s the
Montezuma Creek Navajos were never defeated by the U.S. Army.54 In the
winter of 1863-1864, the U.S. Army under the leadership of Kit Carson began
a scorched-earth campaign against the Navajos, like Sherman's march to the
sea in Georgia. The ultimate goal was to force them onto a reservation, a
"tribal reformatory," at a place called Bosque Redondo on the Pecos River in
New Mexico.ss The Army called this place Fort Sumner; the Navajos called
it Hw6dldi. 6
Carson's campaign was carried out with "frightful thoroughness."" There
were relatively few battles, but the Army methodically marched through
51. TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 141-42, 183-87 (explaining history of the three smaller
portions of the reservation).
52. Archaeologists believe that Navajos were living in northern New Mexico by at least the
1500s and perhaps as early as 1300. MCPHERSON, NAVAJO LAND, supra note 43, at 7. Navajos
and Apaches are both Athabaskan speakers, as are Native Americans living in Canada. This has
led many anthropologists to theorize that the ancestors of both Navajos and Apaches emigrated
from the north to the southwest. Archaeologists studying linguistic differences theorize that
Navajo and Apache had become distinct languages by about 1700 and that both languages had
separated from their northern roots about one thousand years ago. Id. at 6.
53. CLYDE BENALLY ET AL., DINiJi NAKE' NAAHANE': A UTAH NAVAJO HISTORY 83
(1982); MCPHERSON,NAVAJOLAND, supra note 43, at 7 (noting sixteen dates indicating Navajo
sites north of the San Juan River ranging from 1700 to 1800).
54. Their oral tradition proudly proclaims that they were never "slaves" of the white man.
Interview with James Eddie, supra note 41; see also Maryboy & Begay, supra note 25, at 284.
55. TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 138.
56. Hw6ldi is thought to be a corruption of the Spanish word for fort, "fuerte." LAuRANCE
D. LINFORD, NAVAJO PLACES: HISTORY, LEGEND, LANDSCAPE 207 (2000).
57. TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 138.
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Navajoland, burning hogans and fields, driving off the Navaj os' livestock, and
chopping down their fruit trees." To avoid starvation, the Navajos
surrendered, some eight thousand in all." Under armed guard, the Navajos
were marched the three hundred miles from their homeland to Fort Sumner.o
The winter of the march was extraordinarily cold. 6 ' Hundreds died on the
march; elders who could not keep up were sometimes shot; children were
seized by slavers tracking the line of march.62
Navajo history refers to this forced march as the Long Walk, and it became
a formative episode in the evolution of the Navajo nation. Prior to this,
Navajo life was organized around the family and the clan; there was no sense
of belonging to a larger community. The Long Walk and four years of shared
captivity in Hw66ldi changed that.'
The three smaller, separate reservations came into existence at this time.
Both the Ramah and Alamo Navajo communities were founded by families
that had escaped from Fort Sumner prior to the formal release of the Navajo
in 1864.65 The Cafioncito Navajos had begun to separate from the main band
even before the Long Walk. 6 This group advocated peace with the whites and
even acted as scouts for the Army during roundups, earning themselves the
name "Enemy Dind."6  These groups did not fully share in the traumatic
experience ofthe Long Walk and Hw66ldi. Neither did the Montezuma Creek
Navajos. Unlike the others, however, the Montezuma Creek Navajos have
never been recognized as a separate band. 8
The Navajos involved in this litigation, whom I have been calling the
Montezuma Creek Navajos, did not include all Navajos living in San Juan
County, but rather a subgroup living near (from a rural point of view) one
58. BENALLY ET AL., supra note 53, at 127-29; Maryboy & Begay, supra note 25, at 281.
59. BENALLY ET AL., supra note 53, at 130.
60. Id.
61. Maryboy & Begay, supra note 25, at 282.
62. TIMBLE, supra note 41, at 139; Maryboy & Begay, supra note 25, at 282-83.
63. Maryboy & Begay, supra note 25, at 279 (referring to the Long Walk and the
incarceration at Fort Sumner as "seminal" events in Navajo history).
64. BENALLY ET AL., supra note 53, at 136 (referring to the Navajos' "new sense of unity
gained from their experience at Hw66ldi").
65. TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 141-42. The Alamo Navajo community was also partially
founded by refugees from Spanish slavemasters. Id. at 142.
66. Id. at 135.
67. Id. "Dind" is the Navajo word describing the Navajo people collectively. See id at
123.
68. One scholar has argued that the Utah Navajos are "the forgotten people of the Navajo
nation." Ansson, supra note 48, at 573; see also TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 183.
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another along Montezuma Creek in the vicinity of Hatch Trading Post. It
appears that this subgroup had been living in the area for at least 150 years,
unlike some of the other San Juan Navajo groups who had migrated to the area
more recently. The Supreme Court opinion refers to the plaintiffs as
comprising eight families." One descendant of a plaintiff claimed that
originally there were only four clans in the area, all interrelated through a man
called K'aayeli (Man with a Quiver)."o
The Montezuma Creek Navajos followed the traditional Navajo pastoral
lifestyle based upon herding." People resided in widely scattered camps or
outfits made up of extended families living in one or more hogans clustered
together.72 Each family would have at least two residences, a winter place and
a summer place, and would move from place to place as dictated by grazing
needs."
The Navajos, like many Native American groups, have a strong connection
to the land where they live. Traditionally, at birth, a baby's umbilical cord is
buried near where the baby was born to symbolize the person's connection to
the land, which nurtures the person as a mother does.74 "To the Indians who
live in this area, the land is more than just a physical place of survival. It is
all part of a spiritual universe."75
Prior to the coming of the white man, there were no other groups with
whom the Navajos had to compete for grazing in the Montezuma Creek area.
Although Utes were certainly present, their use of the area was primarily for
hunting. 6 From the beginning, Navajos objected to the white man's
69. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 174 (1956).
70. Interview with Frank Benally, Member, Navajo Tribe, in Blanding, Utah (Oct. 6,2000).
"[A]lmost the whole of traditional Navajo social interaction is structured along kinship lines.
Even today in modernized Navajo society, kinship continues to be the most important principle
of organization." MARY SHEPARDSON & BLODWEN HAMMOND, THE NAVAJO MOUNTAIN
COMMuNITY: SOCIALORGANIZATION AND KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY 2 (1970). Kinship is defined
in terms of "clan," which is a group of people who share descent from a common ancestor,
although clan members may be unable to trace their actual genealogical relationship to one
another. Id. at 52.
71. "[T]ranshumance, moving about with the flocks over wide areas, constituted the typical
residence pattern of Navajos both before and after Fort Sumner." SHEPARDSON & HAMMOND,
supra note 70, at 38.
72. Id. at 15.
73. Id.
74. ROBERT S. MCPHERSON, SACRED LAND, SACRED VIEW: NAVAJO PERCEPTIONS OF THE
FouR CORNERS REGION 4 (1992) [hereinafter MCPHERSON, SACRED LAND].
75. MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 14.
76. ROBERT S. MCPHERSON, THE NORTHERN NAvAJO FRONTIER 1860-1900: ExPANSION
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encroaching livestock along Montezuma Creek and other areas." By the turn
of the century, the ranchers and Navajo herders were engaged in what would
become more than fifty years of grazing disputes.
b) The Ranchers
Prior to the late 1870s, European contact was both slight and transitory in
the southeastern corner of what would become the state of Utah. The Spanish
friars Dominguez and Escalante skirted the area in 1776 during their
exploration of routes from Sante Fe to the California missions.78 Mountain
men and trappers were hunting in the area by the 1820s.7 1 In the mid-1800s,
Geographical Survey parties were mapping in the area.so
In the late 1870s, a number of small ranchers entered the country,
"drift[ing] before the movement of the larger frontier."" By 1880, the large
cattle outfits had arrived and began buying out the smaller operations and
taking control of the grazing areas and the water sources. 82 The Lacy (or
Lacey) Cattle Company, also called the L.C., moved into the area around
THROUGH ADVERSITY 51 (1988) [hereinafter MCPHERSON, NORTHERN NAVAJO FRONTIER].
Utes also entered the area to conduct slave raids against the Navajos. Id. at 7.
77. Charles S. Peterson, San Juan: A Hundred Years of Cattle, Sheep, and Dry Farms, in
SAN JUAN COUNTY, UTAH: PEOPLE, RESOURCES, AND HISTORY 171, 175 (Allan Kent Powell ed.,
1983). While from the Navajo perspective the white ranchers were encroaching on their
traditional grazing lands, from the white ranchers' perspective the Navajos were themselves
relative newcomers. A piece published by the Utah State Historical Society states that only "a
very few ... [Navajos] may have lived in San Juan County prior to 1861" and that they became
more numerous only after that time. Gary L. Shumway, Blanding: The Making ofa Community,
in SAN JUAN COUNTY, UTAH: PEOPLE, RESOURCES, AND HISTORY, supra note 77, at 131, 133.
78. Allan Kent Powell, Introduction to SAN JUAN COUNTY, UTAH: PEOPLE, RESOURCES,
AND HISTORY 1, 1-2 (Allan Kent Powell ed., 1983); MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at
76-77.
79. MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 85-86.
80. Gregory C. Thompson, Utah'sIndian Country: TheAmerican Indian Experience in San
Juan County, 1700-1980, in SAN JUAN COUNTY, UTAH: PEOPLE, RESOURCES, AND HISTORY,
supra note 77, at 51, 57-58. One member of the survey party "met a group of Indians in the
Montezuma Creek area that forced him to beat a hasty retreat toward Colorado." Id at 58. In
1874, one of the first photographs of the area was taken of an Ancestral Puebloan ruin in
McElmo Canyon by William Henry Jackson, a photographer with the Hayden Survey. David
Roberts, Riddles of the Anasazi, SMrrHSONIAN, July 2003, at 72, 78; see also RICHARD A.
BARTLETr, GREAT SURVEYS OF THE AMERICAN WEST 115-16 (1962) (quoting from Jackson's
diary regarding the making of the photograph).
81. Peterson, supra note 77, at 174; see also MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 172.
82. MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 172.
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Montezuma and Recapture Creeks, driving in an estimated 17,000 head of
cattle from the Texas Panhandle.83
A few homesteaders had also settled in the area. In 1877, "the first
recorded white settler, Peter Shirts" established a homestead at the mouth of
Montezuma Creek on the San Juan River.84 By the following year, there were
eighteen families (seventy people) settled in McElmo Canyon and along the
San Juan River." Prospectors also began entering the region. In 1883, Cass
Hite found placer gold on the San Juan at the mouth of White Canyon.
Hite's report set off a minor gold rush that lasted off-and-on for a decade or
so. 8 7
None of these groups was to shape the future of this area as much as the
final wave of immigrants: the Mormons. Mormon settlers entered the area
from the west," moving eastward against the westward flow of most pioneers.
The settlers came at the behest of church officials who wished both to claim
agricultural lands in the Utah territory for Mormon settlement and to erect a
bulwark against encroaching non-Mormon settlement from the east."
Unlike many other western pioneers who were looking for a better life, the
Mormon settlers of San Juan County were acting under a religious
imperative,o which meant that, at least in their own eyes, their actions were
not purely economic. They came to San Juan County because their God had
"called" them on a mission to settle it and appointed it as their piece of the
promised land; no doubt this would color their later perception of their right
to the land."
Thus, both the Montezuma Creek Navajos and the Mormon settlers had a
deeper connection to the land than was usual among twentieth-century
Americans. Both groups had a spiritual connection to the land92 that went
83. Id. at 172; see also Peterson, supra note 77, at 175-77.
84. McPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 96.
85. Id. at 122.
86. Id. at 242.
87. Id. at 126, 242, 244.
88. Allan Kent Powell, TheHole-in-the-Rock Trail a Century Later, in SANJUAN COUNTY,
UTAH: PEOPLE, RESOURCES, AND HISTORY, supra note 77, at 89, 95.
89. Id. at 92-93; MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 97.
90. MCPHERSON, NORTHERN NAvAJO FRONTIER, supra note 76, at 24.
91. Id. at 26-27. "[T]he Mormon God was with His elect, guiding and directing them to
the lands in which they were to live, just as the Navajos were supernaturally guided and
protected in their territory." Id. at 26.
92. E.g., Shumway, supra note 77, at 137 (quoting one of the original settlers of Blanding,
Utah, who said the townsite "had been appointed as our promised land"). "An important
concept shared by both religions [Mormon and Navajo] was that of a promised land."
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beyond merely looking to it for physical sustenance. This profound
connection to place on the part of both groups is the emotional engine that
drives the tension between them.
The story of the Mormons' arrival in San Juan County is a saga of epic
proportions. An initial exploring party of thirty men, two women, and eight
children arrived in mid-1879 and established a small settlement, optimistically
named Fort Montezuma, on the San Juan a little upstream from the mouth of
Montezuma Creek.93 Two families remained there while the bulk of the party
returned to Cedar City in southwestern Utah to report on routes. Because of
problems with the scouted routes, another, relatively unexplored, route was
chosen for the main party-the route which would become famous as the
"Hole-in-the-Rock Trail."
The Mormon pioneers' journey along this route has been called "the most
appalling wagon trip ever taken anywhere."94 For six months, some 230 men,
women, and children struggled to cross a region that remains to this day one
of the most rugged and inhospitable in the continental United States. They
built some 180 miles of road during the winter of 1879-1880, through sand
and over slickrock, down a forty-five-foot sheer cliff followed by a dugway
across a long slickrock slope, across the Colorado River, over more slickrock
and more sand, up and down more cliffs, hacking a passageway through
juniper-pifion forests, struggling through blizzards and cold, all without the
loss of a single human life." It has been pointed out that some wagon trains
"traveled half the continent in less time than it took [this group] to cross the
corner of one state."9
Taking their cue from the big cattle outfits, the Mormons in San Juan
County, unlike Mormons who settled elsewhere, moved away from farming
and into cooperative livestock management.97 They formed the Bluff Pool and
engaged in head-on competition with the big outfits, using "tactics that earned
them the name of 'Bluff Tigers' among non-Mormons." 8 Although the
Mormons adopted Texan ranching ways, they did not mingle with the
MCPHERSON, NORTHERN NAVAJO FRONTIER, supra note 76, at 24-25.
93. MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 97; see also Powell, supra note 88, at 95-113.
94. STEGNER, supra note 38, at 116.
95. Powell, supra note 88, at 89-114. The river gorge at the Hole-in-the-Rock crossing is
1200 feet deep. MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 98.
96. Id. at 113 (quoting DAVID LAVENDER, ONE MAN'S WEST 184 (1964)).
97. Peterson, supra note 77, at 175.
98. Id.; see also MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 173.
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cowboys. In fact, they shunned them and denounced their hard-living
lifestyle."
The Mormons turned out to be "better stayers."oo The early 1880s had
been a wet era, but the 1890s were a time of drought.'o' The national
economy went bust in 1893, and "by 1895 bonanza had turned to near panic
and the big [cattle] outfits began to fall apart or get out." 02 Eventually, the
Mormons took control of the livestock industry in the county. Their
descendants would continue to dominate the industry through the middle of
the twentieth century.
A second wave of Mormon immigration to San Juan County occurred early
in the twentieth century. Between 1912 and 1916, an influx of Mormon
"Pachecoites" from Mexico arrived.o 3 These were descendants of Mormon
polygamists who "had fled south of the border during the intense
antipolygamy activity of the 1870s and 1880s."'" These Mormon expatriates
were now threatened by Pancho Villa and other Mexican revolutionaries and
returned to Utah in order to avoid the revolutionary violence.os Because the
available ranching land had been claimed by the original Mormon settlers,
these new immigrants tended to be craftsmen and laborers, ranch hands rather
than ranch owners.0 6
With the demise of the big Texan outfits by the late 1890s, the ranchers'
only significant competition for rangeland came from Navajo livestock
holders.' 7 From the turn of the century until the 1950s, the tensions between
these two groups ebbed and flowed but were never resolved. It could
legitimately be called a fifty-year range war.
99. Peterson, supra note 77, at 176.
100. Id. at 181.
101. MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 174; Peterson, supra note 77, at 180.
102. Peterson, supra note 77, at 180.
103. Coincidentally, one of the government's primary witnesses, Dee Black, the range aide
who oversaw the roundup and disposal of the Navajo horses, was one of these returning
Mormons. He testified that he had been born in Mexico and moved with his family to San Juan
County in 1912. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 383, 457.
104. MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 112.
105. Id.
106. Clarence Rogers, Personal Reminiscences ofSan Juan County, in SAN JUAN COUNTY,
UTAH: PEOPLE, RESOURCES, AND HISTORY, supra note 77, at 153, 158.
107. MCPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at 173.
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c) The BLM
At the time the Hatahley lawsuit began in 1953, the BLM was just seven
years old. Created a year after the end of World War II, the BLM was
charged, among other tasks, with administering a new and comprehensive
system of grazing leases under the Taylor Grazing Act. It was also struggling
for legitimacy in the eyes of both the ranchers, who were suspicious of the
new federal oversight, and of Congress, whose support of the new agency was
ambivalent at best. The reasons for this suspicion and ambivalence are rooted
in the evolution of public-land policy in the American West.
"The vast majority of the BLM lands are the remnants of the original
public domain following 200 years of land grants. . . [and] withdrawals." 0 8
In the beginning, federal land policy focused on selling the public lands as a
source of revenue for the federal government.' By 1812, sales were so brisk
that Congress created the General Land Office (GLO) to oversee the transfers
of title."o Originally placed within the Treasury Department (no doubt
reflecting its primary purpose of generating revenue), in 1849 it was
transferred to the new Department of the Interior."'
In 1841, Congress passed the first general homesteading statute, the
Preemption Law of 1841."' This law, which has been called a "frontier
triumph,"" 3 allowed heads of families, widows, and single men over twenty-
one, who were either citizens or intending to become citizens, a one-time
privilege of entering and cultivating up to 160 acres of public land at a
minimum price." 4 Under the Homestead Act of 1862, public lands could be
obtained "free" after five years of residence and cultivation."' The push for
homesteads continued until the First World War, when lack of land suitable
for agriculture, the draft, increasing industrialization, and drought ended the
homesteading era.'
108. Rod Greeno, Who Controls the Bureau of Land Management?, 11 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 51, 51 (1990-1991).
109. JAMES MUHN & HANSON R. STUART, OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE: THE STORY OF
THE BLM 5-13 (1988). Federal land policy also provided land to reward military service. This
practice began with the Revolutionary War and continued until the Civil War. Id. at 11-12.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id
112. Id. at 13.
113. Id. (quoting historian Roy Robbins).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 14, 16.
116. Id. at 35.
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In the second half of the nineteenth century, land was also transferred out
of the public domain to further other purposes such as the development of
townsites, state colleges, mining, lumbering, and irrigation projects.'" By the
end of the century, as the remaining "public domain was rapidly
diminishing,""' the concept of conservation of public lands began to take
hold."'
It is interesting to note that, while grazing was always an important use of
the public lands, it was not recognized as an independent basis for acquiring
public land until the Stockraising Homestead Law of 1916.120 This law
enlarged the typical homestead grant of 160 acres to 640 acres (a section), but
even that was not large enough to support a ranching operation in the semi-
arid West, so ranchers depended upon use of the public range.
Use of the public range in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
was basically unregulated. This led to what is called the "tragedy of the
commons."l 2' Having no vested interest in the land, ranchers put as many
animals as they could on the range, which resulted in severe overgrazing.'22
As one federal official put it, "It was a clear case of first come, first served
and the devil take the hindmost." 2 3 Even though as early as the 1870s it was
recognized that there was more stock on the public lands than the land could
support, it was not until the 1920s that proposals for a leasing system were
taken seriously.124
Opposition from stockmen to the idea of paying for what they were
currently using for free, as well as a states' rights movement seeking to cede
federal public lands to the states, held up passage of any grazing-lease bill
until 1934, when the Taylor Grazing Act was passed.125  A Division of
Grazing had been established within the Department of the Interior in the
117. Id. at 16-20, 22-23.
118. Id. at 26.
119. Id. at 28.
120. Id. at 36.
121. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). Where land
is held in common among a community, each individual herdsman tries to maximize the benefit
to him by grazing as many animals as possible, with the inevitable consequence that the
commons becomes overgrazed. "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." Id.
122. It is estimated that in the mid-i 880s the large cattle companies were grazing as many
as 100,000 head of cattle in southeastern Utah. MCPHERSON, NORTHERN NAvAJO FRONTIER,
supra note 76, at 56.
123. MUHN& STUART, supra note 109, at 35 (quoting Will C. Bames, Chief of Grazing for
the Forest Service, in 1926).
124. Id. at 35-36.
125. Id. at 37.
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1930s to administer the leases under the Act.126 Public lands thought suitable
for grazing were organized into grazing districts. To encourage acceptance of
the new regime, local advisory boards were set up for each grazing district.127
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) workers were enlisted to develop water
sources and erect fencing as part of the move to improve range
management.128 In 1941, the Division of Grazing was renamed the U.S.
Grazing Service and, reflecting its importance to western interests, moved
from Washington, D.C. to Salt Lake City.129
World War II brought the conservation and range-management work of the
U.S. Grazing Service to a halt,'30 as men and energy were redirected to the war
effort. At the same time, livestock trespasses increased in an effort to meet the
wartime demand for beef.'"' The lack of enforcement of the lease system dealt
a serious blow to the Service's credibility.
The Grazing Service had other problems as well; a study in 1941 showed
that the grazing fees were far below market value and the Service proposed to
triple them.'32 Opposition to any fee increase was fierce, especially among the
Western states. At the same time, the House Appropriations Committee was
pressuring the Service to become mostly self-sufficient.'33 The Service
ultimately dropped the attempt to increase fees, and the House retaliated by
slashing its budget. 14
Interior Department officials began to consider merging the Grazing
Service with the GLO in an attempt to make public-land administration more
efficient. In July 1946, the two were indeed merged, and the new agency was
named the Bureau of Land Management.'
By this time, the range in San Juan County (and indeed much of the West)
was severely degraded as a result of overgrazing.' 6 The BLM was thus faced
126. Id. at 37-38. There had been some question as to whether the Department of the
Interior or the Department of Agriculture (which included the Forest Service) would administer
the grazing leases, but the Forest Service had alienated ranching interests by proposing to raise
grazing fees in the national forests. Id. at 36.
127. Id. at 39.
128. Id. at 41.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 45-47.
131. Id. at 47.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 48.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 48-49.
136. See, e.g., Memorandum from Warren J. Gray, Acting Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'1
Adm'r, Div. of Range Mgmt., BLM (Sept. 2, 1949) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13,
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with the daunting task of accommodating scientific range management to the
political realities of the time and place. As the direct descendant of the
Grazing Service, the BLM inherited the ranchers' ill will from the earlier
attempt to raise grazing fees. At the same time, it needed to establish its
credibility as an effective steward of the land. It needed to "mend fences,"
both literally and figuratively.
The BLM files give many examples of this political pressure in the context
of the range disputes between white stockmen and Navajo herders.'37 As the
Regional Administrator explained the situation in 1948 to the Director:
This Navajo trespass is a very serious matter both from the
conservation and the range administration viewpoints .... [Indian
year-long use] is weakening the forage growth and forming "sore
spots" all over the range. From an administrative viewpoint it is
undermining the administration of grazing district 6 as the
whiteman users cannot understand why the Federal Range Code
and the rules of Fair Range Practice do not apply equally to all.138
Hatahley v. United States, No. C-36-53 (D. Utah Jan. 22, 1954)).
137. See, e.g., Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Dist. Grazier, BLM, to Reg'l Adm'r,
Branch of Range Mgmt., BLM (Aug. 31, 1948) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13, Hatahley,
No. C-36-53) (stating that "the stockmen in this area are very much disturbed about this Indian
use yearlong and the ultimate damage to their winter range"); Letter from Leland W. Redd,
rancher, to Chelsey P. Seely, Reg'1 Chief, BLM (Sept. 20, 1948) (contained in Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 13, Hatahley, No. C-36-53) (asking for the BLM to do something about Indian use of
the range); Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'l Adm'r, Div.
ofRangeMgmt., BLM (Apr. 29, 1949) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13, Hatahley, No. C-36-
53) (reporting that a cattleman threatened to take his stock to another part of the range if Indian
use was not halted and stating that "if this organization expects to gain any respect ... someone
certainly had better get hot on the job"); Memorandum from H. Byron Mock, Reg'1 Adm'r,
Col.-Utah Region, BLM, to Dir., BLM (May 26, 1949) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13,
Hatahley, No. C-36-53) (noting "[n]umerous complaints ... from the white users of the range
in this district"); Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, to Reg'1 Adm'r, Div.
ofRange Mgmt., BLM (Nov. 1, 1950) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12, Hatahley, No. C-36-
53) (noting that "[a]ll of the stockmen . . . have again been in this office requesting relief");
Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'1 Adm'r, Div. of Range
Mgmt., BLM (Jan. 24, 1951) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8, Hatahley, No. C-36-53)
(complaining that "our apparent inability to do anything about these matters, certainly hasn't
caused our stock to boom the least bit").
138. Letter from H. Byron Mock, Reg'1 Adm'r, BLM, to Dir., BLM (Oct. 18, 1948)
(contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13, Hatahley, No. C-36-53).
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2. A Fifty-Year Range War: 1900-1952
The roundup and destruction of the Navajo horses and burros in 1952 and
1953 was not an isolated incident. It was the culmination of over fifty years
of conflict between the Navajos and the white ranchers of San Juan County.
In some ways this conflict was unusual: "While other Indians were removed
for depradating, the [Montezuma Creek] Navajos caused trouble by making
productive use of the land in competition with the various groups of
whites." 39 In other words, this ongoing conflict was in the nature of a "range
war" over access to grazing lands.
In recounting the history of this conflict, I have divided the years into two
periods, the pre-Taylor Grazing Act period, during which time both groups
had the same legal right to use the public range, and after the passage of the
Act in 1934, when use of the public lands was limited to permit-holders by
law.
a) Pre-Taylor Grazing Act
Prior to the 1870s, there were no significant problems between the Navajos
and white settlers in the Montezuma Creek-McCracken Mesa area, mainly
because there were almost no white settlers. Over the next thirty-or-so years,
there were isolated incidents, but the tension was building between white
ranchers and the Native Americans. 4 0 By the early years of the new century,
the stage was set for conflict.
The pressures exerted by the various stakeholders in southeastern Utah are
revealed by the checkered history of the Navajo reservation boundaries in this
area. In 1884, responding to conflict between Navajos and local ranchers over
land, President Chester Arthur signed an executive order extending the
northern boundary of the Navajo reservation from the Arizona-Utah state line
to the San Juan River.14 ' The hope was that this would relieve pressure by
giving Navajos more grazing lands of their own, thereby reducing their use of
the public domain. From the perspective of white ranchers, all Navajos ought
to have been using only reservation lands, not the public lands. The Navajos,
however, had as much right as anyone else to use the public lands for
139. Brugge, supra note 16, at 16.
140. "Turbulence was characteristic of events in this period...." McPHERSON, NORTHERN
FRONTIER, supra note 76, at 82. Although the Navajos were the only tribe that engaged in
substantial grazing, both the Utes and Paiutes had run-ins with white residents over hunting and
access to other subsistence resources. Id. at 61-62.
141. Id. at 83.
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grazing.142 Navajos living north of the San Juan River, moreover, had little
incentive to herd their stock across the river.14 3
Over the next forty years, the reservation boundaries in the area would
fluctuate five times.'" None of the additions to the Navajo Reservation in
Utah solved the grazing issues in the Montezuma Creek-McCracken Mesa
area. As early as November 1917, Evan W. Estep, the new Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) superintendent at Shiprock, New Mexico, reported signs of
impending trouble'45 : "There are a number of Indians living offthe reservation
over in Utah, at lease [sic] four of whom have made considerable
improvement on their places. [S]ome irrigation work of some value. I am
advised that the white settlers in their vicinity [are] beginning to want to
crowd them out ... "146 In January 1921, an Indian agent stationed at Aneth,
Utah reported to Estep, "We have been having considerable trouble with the
sheep and cattlemen adjoining the reservation on the north. It has always been
[sic] troublesome problem for years . . . . Estep then wrote to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs:
The outside stock men are crowding the Indians just about as hard
as it is possible to crowd them and avoid trouble. Heretofore we
have had comparatively little trouble with the Utah stock [men].
Nearly all of these stockmen are members of the Mormon Church,
and the attitude of this church and it's [sic] membership towards
142. Id. at 82.
143. In the traditional Navajo world-view, the San Juan River is a powerful being, and
crossing it inspired fear. MCPHERSON, NAVAJO LAND, supra note 43, at 68.
144. After the 1884 addition to the reservation, mining interests lobbying for and receiving
the return of lands to the public domain caused an area known as the Paiute Strip (all lands in
Utah south of the San Juan River and west of longitude 110 degrees) to be removed from the
Navajo reservation. MCPHERSON, NORTHERN NAVAJO FRONTIER, supra note 76, at 88;
MCPHERSON, NAVAJO LAND, supra note 43, at 18-19. In 1905, the Aneth Strip, a "small
portion of land in the Montezuma Creek area of Utah [north of the San Juan River] was added
[to the reservation]." MCPHERSON, NORTHERN NAVAJO FRONTIER, supra note 76, at 91;
Ansson, supra note 48, at 576 n.153. Then, in 1908, the Paiute Strip was again added to the
reservation. MCPHERSON, NAVAJO LAND, supra note 43, at 18. Owners of mineral interests,
this time in oil, almost immediately began politicking for the return of these lands to the public
domain and, in 1922, much of the Paiute Strip was again taken from the reservation and once
more placed in the public domain. MCPHERSON, NAVAJO LAND, supra note 43, at 19.
145. Perhaps it is no coincidence that this was right after the second wave of Mormon in-
migration to the county, an event that probably put new pressure on the already-stretched-thin
grazing resources. See supra text accompanying notes 103-106.
146. Brugge, supra note 16, at 166.
147. Id. at 168.
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the Indians has always been quite friendly, and considerate ....
The present offenders are the younger stock men and apparently
the younger Mormons are not of the same caliber as their fathers
were. . . . The larceny of Indian cattle has been a profitable
industry for a number of years past. It is claimed that several men
have grown quite wealthy and influential in the practice of this
industry.148
The farm agent for the Navajos at Aneth had a slightly different explanation
for the increasing tension between whites and Navajos: "On [account] of the
open range being taken up by settlers the sheep and cattlemen are engaged in
a scramble for what range is left. . . .""4
In 1923 and 1924, in an effort to protect the interests of Montezuma Creek
Navajos who had been living "off the reservation" for many years, an allotting
agent was sent to assist the Navajos in preparing homestead applications. 0
Of the families involved in the later Hatahley litigation, several filed for their
allotments."' The allotments were allowed in 1923, and patents were issued
148. Id. at 169-70 (letter of Feb. 5, 1921).
149. Id. at 168 (letter of Jan. 29, 1921).
150. Brugge, supra note 16, at 171.
151. Tracking individuals through the documentation is often difficult, as Navajo names
were fluid in this period. Often an individual would be known by several names depending on
the context. For example, many Navajos adopted European names, e.g., Carolyn (sometimes
spelled Caroline) Rentz, but would still be known among other Navajos by their Navajo names,
e.g., Carolyn Rentz was also known as Nagashi Bitashie. Id. at 167-68. Adding further
confusion, the spelling of Navajo names at that time was not standardized, e.g., Tse-
KisilSakizzie.
Comparing the list of the allotments noted id. at 171-76 with the list of plaintiffs in the
Hatahley lawsuit, the following names appear on both lists:
Widow Sleepy/Sleepy. In his 1923 application, Sleepy claimed to have been
living on his land in the Montezuma Creek area since 1903. Apparently by the
time of the litigation he was deceased, as Widow Sleepy is one of the plaintiffs.
Natone Begay/Bega. This individual prosecuted an application in his own name
in which he asserted he had been living in his home since 1915. In addition, his
name means Son ofNatone, and a Not-ton-ne (a phonetic spelling of Natone) was
living in the area in 1909.
Mark Tootsonian/T. T. Sone. He had been living on his allotment since 1921.
In addition, Carolyn Rentz, the mother of plaintiff Mary Jay, filed an application
asserting she had been living on her land since 1903.
Based upon the similarity in the last names, another possible correlation exists between Slim
Todachennie and the allotment application of Laura Deschenne.
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in 1925.152 Not all of the Montezuma Creek Navajos, however, were helped
in making applications. Apparently, the allotting agent was re-assigned before
all of the applications were prepared.'' Moreover, the allotments were for
only 160 acres, which was not sufficient to provide grazing for the typical
Navajo sheep herd.'54 And in at least one instance, the fact that a Navajo
family had obtained a homestead allotment on their land did not prevent them
from being harassed to such an extent that they moved to the south bank of the
San Juan River."'
"In 1927 a renewal of the range dispute arose, with the white stockmen
protesting Navajos' use of land both north and south of the San Juan."'16 The
new superintendent at Shiprock, B.P. Six, reported in 1930:
For many years the Navajo Indians who have been living in
Southeastern Utah northwest of the San Juan River, in the vicinity
ofMontezuma and Recapture Creeks, have been grazing their stock
on the public domain in that vicinity. Continual clashes have
occurred between these Indians and the white stockmen who have
been using the same range.'
In 1933, the final adjustment in this period to the reservation boundaries in
Utah occurred.' The Paiute Strip was once more returned to the Navajo
Reservation, and an area called the Aneth Extension, running from
Montezuma Creek east to the Colorado state line and then north just past the
Aneth area (which had been added in 1905), was now brought within the
reservation.
The negotiations over the Aneth Extension spanned several years (1930-
1933) and implicated the grazing problems in the Montezuma Creek area. In
September 1932, Field Agent Radcliffe, Superintendent McCray, and local
stockman S.J. Jensen visited the area as part of the negotiations relating to the
addition of the Paiute Strip to the reservation.
152. Brugge, supra note 16, at 176.
153. Id. at 177.
154. It would take ten acres to support one sheep, and a Navajo family would need a herd
of at least two hundred sheep to support themselves. Id. at 176B.
155. See First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 171-75 (testimony of Jim Joe's Daughter).
156. Brugge, supra note 16, at 176.
157. Id. at 177.
158. Additional land was added to the reservation in 1959. See infra text accompanying
notes 345-46.
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It was reported to us that some Indian improvements [in the
Montezuma Creek] area have been destroyed by the white
homesteaders, and that last winter approximately 70 head of Indian
horses were killed. It seems that the past year a bitter feeling has
developed between the Indians and the non-Indians due to the fact
that these improvements were destroyed. This was not only told us
by the Indians, but by Ira Hatch, trader, on Montezuma Creek . . ..'
Cheschillige, the Chairman of the Navajo Council, wrote to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in late 1932 arguing in favor of the Aneth
Extension: "There has been considerable trouble in this section on account of
the white settlers not respecting the rights of Indians on the Public Domain.
They have driven Navajos off land that they have occupied for many years as
well as killing their horses . . . ."o
The whites took a different view. In opposing the addition of the Aneth
Extension to the reservation, one said:
At the present time there are almost a thousand head of cattle and
ten thousand head of sheep being wintered in this area. This land
is used exclusively as a winter range [by the white ranchers] and
always has been. The few Indian families that are in this area are
only trespassers that are off the reservations . . . ."'
The alleged "trespassing" indicates the ranchers' belief that the Navajos
should be restricted to grazing on the reservation, as at that time the range was
open to all users on a first-come, first-served basis.16 2 It was not until after the
passage of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 that the use of the range was
limited to specific permittees. The legislation adding the Aneth Extension to
the Navajo reservation provided that no further allotments to individual
Navajos would be permitted north of the San Juan River as a compromise to
the ranching interests.6 3
159. Brugge, supra note 16, at 196.
160. Id. at 197-98 (letter of Dec. 11, 1932).
161. Id. at 198 (letter of Jan. 25, 1933).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
163. MCPHERSON, NAVAJO LAND, supra note 43, at 20. In 1934, Congress ended all
allotments to individual Native Americans under the Indian Reorganization Act. 25 U.S.C. §§
461-479 (2006). From our twenty-first-century perspective, this legislation appears patently
discriminatory, precluding a segment of the population from the right to homestead based on
their race.
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b) Post-Taylor Grazing Act
An opportunity to resolve the range conflicts between Navajos and white
ranchers arose with the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934. The Act
provided for the lease of grazing-district lands first "to landowners and
homesteaders in or adjacent to the [public lands]" through leases with a term
of one to ten years." Priority was given to those with experience and with
adequate private land to support their herds when not grazing on public
lands.' Other criteria for issuing leases "weighed property ownership and
traditional use."166
"In the fall [of 1934] it was decided to try to obtain Navajo rights to
McCracken Mesa under the Taylor Grazing Act."' 7 A report to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated:
The land in township 39 south, ranges 23 and 24 East, as well
as in Township 40 South, Range 23 east and a portion of Range 25
east, is of the mesa type and has been used by the Indians for many
years. Mr. Rodcliffe [sic], Field Agent, states that in 1914 he was
in this area with a Geological Survey crew and many of the Indians
that he met recently on that area were already occupying the
McCracken Mesa in 1914... . Mr. Radcliffe also states that there
are approximately 4500 head of Indian cattle and sheep grazing on
this area. Of this number of stock, the majority are sheep.
The Indians are living along Montezuma Creek and the
Recapture Wash. At the present time there are fifteen families
dependent on this area for thier [sic] grazing and these Indians
have always lived north of the San Juan River and did not migrate
into this section in recent years. The fifteen families represent
approximately sixty to seventy-five Indians.
I feel that we have [a] very strong and indisputable claim on the
so-called McCracken Mesa.' 6 1
Less than a year later, it appears that the Navajos had been shut out of the
permitting process.
164. MuHN & STUART, supra note 109, at 37.
165. Id. at 38.
166. Id.
167. Brugge, supra note 16, at 203.
168. Id. at 203-04 (quoting letter of forester William Zeh, dated Nov. 9, 1934).
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In June 1935, Utah Grazing District No. 6 was established,16 9 encompassing
San Juan County (as well as portions of other counties). The first meeting of
the Advisory Board of Grazing District No. 6 was held in September 1935.
"[T]he Indians were not represented and no application was made for any
allocation of grazing area for their use. The entire area was allocated to the
neighboring white grazers."o A local historian summarized the allocation
process that excluded the Navajos as follows:
In about 1935, with the establishment of the Taylor Grazing Act
provisions, the local stockmen were faced with the problem of
formally dividing up the range land in a way that would be
acceptable to individual ranchers and to the Grazing Service. This
distribution process bubbled with emotion and other complications,
and it took many months, climaxed by a marathon talk session
lasting more than twenty-four hours, before an agreement was
reached. From the beginning, however, it was agreed that no
Navajos should be with their herds in the area north of the San
Juan River, and a fence was built for the purpose of keeping the
Navajo sheep off the white stockmen's winter grazing range."'
In November of that year, the first trespass notices were served on seven
Navajos.1'
At a December 1935 meeting at Hatch's trading post it was agreed that
whites would postpone any action until May 1936 and that Navajos could
continue grazing on McCracken Mesa until then."' It was hoped, rather
169. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF NAVAJO TRESPASS, UTAH
DISTRICT#6 (1953) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, Hatahley v. United States,No. C-36-53
(D. Utah Jan. 22, 1954)) [hereinafter CHRONOLOGY].
170. Brugge, supra note 16, at 212, 216 (quoting letter of alloting agent Charles E. Roblin
to Forestry Service, Mar. 3, 1936). The "white grazers" were the ranchers in the Blanding area,
members of Grazing District No. 6, who were primarily descendants of the original Mormon
settlers. This connection between the white ranchers in the Montezuma Creek area and the LDS
Church is illustrated by an incident from 1950 where an LDS Church official was present at a
meeting of the white ranchers and indicated that the Church would support the ranchers.
Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'l Adm'r, BLM (Nov. 19,
1950) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12, Hatahley, No. C-36-53).
171. Shumway, supra note 77, at 147-48; see also id. at 148 (recounting the story of Jim
Vijil, a Navajo who lived near the mouth of Recapture Creek and refused to be budged from his
land, even at the point of a gun).
172. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 169, at 1. The following were noted as being served: Jim
Hammond, Anteze, Jim Jo Son-in-Law, Randolf, Big Girl, Caroline, and Goat Man. Id. at 12.
173. Brugge, supra note 16, at 215.
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wistfully, that when permanent allocations were made under the permitting
system the Navajos would be represented. 4
In April 1936, the Superintendent of the Navajo Agency applied for and
received a temporary permit to graze 150 horses and 3000 sheep and goats in
District No. 6 from May through July. In July, he sought to have the permit
renewed, but it was denied."'
In 1939 and 1940, trespass notices were served on more Navajos."' In
1941, as a result of negotiations between the Grazing Service and the Navajo
Agency, grazing allotments for seven Navajo families were issued, not
individually but in the name of the Navajo Agency."' The permit allowed
grazing in District No. 6 between October and May, the "winter range."
During the summer, the permittees were supposed to move their stock
elsewhere.
These permits were renewed annually until October 1946. Until that year,
the only trespassing notice issued was to Hosteen Sakizzie, in 1944."' During
this period, of course, World War H was raging, and everyone's attention was
elsewhere.
In July 1946, the Grazing Service became the BLM. During that year, the
permits were issued to the seven families individually."' In October 1947, the
174. See id. at 216.
175. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 169, at 1.
176. Id. at 12 (noting Hosteen Hoskcon, Eddie Nockie, RandolfBenally, Jim Hatathaly, and
S.P. Jones were served notices in 1940); Memorandum from Hugh M. Bryan, Range
Conservationist, BLM, to Reg'1 Adm'r, Div. ofRange Mgmt., BLM (Dec. 11, 1949) (contained
in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13, Hatabley v. United States, No. C-36-53 (D. Utah Jan. 22, 1954))
[hereinafter Dec. 1949 Memo] (noting that Bill Hattley, Randolph Benelly, Nottony Baga, and
Bece Laca Ason were served in October 1939; that S.P. Jones was in trespass but could not be
located to be served; that Sakeisey, Randolph Benally, Honey Squaw, and Charlie Boy Wife
were served in March 1940; and that the five from CHRONOLOGY, supra note 169, were served
in August 1940, with Sakizzie, Jim Hernandez, and Caroline Hugh Rentz also reported in
trespass but not noted as served).
177. Dec. 1949 Memo, supra note 176 (noting that the families were those of Nakai Denet
Begay, James Hatathly, Jim Joe, Randalph Bennally, S.P. Jones, Eddie Nocki, and Hosteen
Hoskcon; noticeably absent from this list are Hosteen Sakizzie and Cyrus Begay, who would
become prime movers in the litigation). In April 1942, the Office of Indian Affairs applied for
grazing permits for an additional eleven Navajo families. "No adjudication of these applications
are [sic] on record." CHRONOLOGY, supra note 169, at 2.
178. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 169, at 12.
179. 1 have been unable to determine whether this was due to a change in regulations or due
to the exercise of discretion by the range manager, although I suspect the latter. See
Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'1 Adm'r, BLM (Dec. 26,
1950) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12, Hatahley, No. C-36-53) ("Issuance of individual
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licenses were not renewed due to the Navajos' failure to remove their stock
during the summer months and to limit their herds to the specified numbers.'o
Between 1935, when the first trespass notice was issued against a Navajo
for grazing without a permit, and 1946, only a handful of notices had been
served on any Navajos. After 1946, it became a regular occurrence, but the
BLM was unsure what its enforcement powers were, and so for a few years
nothing was done beyond serving the notices. Pressure was building,
however, with white ranchers threatening to ignore the grazing regulations if
the BLM was not going to enforce them against the Navajos.'8 '
3. The Range War Moves into the Courtroom
Just as the roundup and destruction of the Navajo horses and burros in late
1952 and early 1953 was not an isolated instance of violence, the Hatahley
case was not an isolated piece of litigation. To evaluate it accurately, the case
must be considered in the context of a series of related cases.
a) First Salvo: United States v. Tse-Kesi
In February 1950, the federal government filed a trespass suit, United States
v. Tse-Kisi.18 2 The case is significant because it was in many ways a preview
of the Hatahley case. The same personages would feature prominently in both
cases: basically the same parties, the same attorneys,' 3 and also the same
judge. The underlying issue in both cases was also the same: whether the
Navajos were entitled to use the range. Due to factual and procedural
differences in the two cases, however, that issue was more explicitly presented
in Tse-Kesi.
licenses ... was done in order to treat them as individuals or like any other stockman operating
on the Federal Range.").
180. See Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'l Adm'r,
Div. of Range Mgmt., BLM (Jan. 24, 1951) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, Hatahley, No.
C-36-53). See also Memorandum from H. Byron Mock, Reg'l Adm'r, BLM, to Dir., BLM
(Dec. 26, 1950) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12, Hatahley, No. C-36-53).
181. See Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'l Adm'r,
Div. of Range Mgmt., BLM at 2 (Apr. 29, 1949) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13, Hatahley,
No. C-36-53).
182. 93 F. Supp. 745, 746 (D. Utah 1950), rev'd, 191 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1951).
183. The individual Assistant U.S. Attorney was different, O.K. Clay for Tse-Kesi and
Llewellyn 0. Thomas for Hatahley. See, e.g., United States v. Hatahley(Hatahleyll), 257 F.2d
920, 921 (10th Cir. 1958); Tse-Kisi, 93 F. Supp. at 746. Knox Patterson was the attorney for
the Navajos in both cases until his death in 1952, at which time he was replaced by Milton A.
Oman. See, e.g., Hatahley II, 257 F.2d at 921; Tse-Kisi, 93 F. Supp. at 746.
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From the government's perspective, the case was a sort of test case against
two Navajos, Eddie Nakai and Hosteen Sakizzie.184 I suspect that these two
were chosen because they were both recognized leaders among the Navajos.
They were recognized as such in part because they both were successful-they
both had large herds, and both had access to cash. But in part, their leadership
was also a recognition of their refusal to give in to the white ranchers.
Sakizzie in particular emerges from the archival records as a vibrant and
strong personality. The whites were always accusing him of being a
troublemaker,' but the Navajos describe him as a man who would not back
down, one who stood up and said "no" when the whites told him to leave.'
The complaint alleged that Sakizzie and Eddie Nakai were running
livestock on the federally owned range without permission and sought an
injunction prohibiting them from further trespasses.' A few months later,
another forty-one individual Navajos were added as defendants.' There is
significant overlap between all of these Navajos and the plaintiffs in the later
Hatahley case.
184. There are several variations on the name Sakizzie in the records. In addition to Tse-
Kizi, the name is also given as Sakeisy. See supra note 176. Eddie Nakai also appears as Eddie
Nocki. Id.
185. See, e.g., Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'1
Adm'r, Div. of Range Mgmt., BLM (Apr. 5, 1951) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11,
Hatahley, No. C-36-53).
186. NAVAJO OSHLEY, THE JOURNEY OF NAVAJO OSHLEY: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND LIFE
HISTORY 153 (Robert S. McPherson ed., 2000) ("They always tried to do things to a man called
Tsdk'izi [Crack between the Rocks], but his answer was always no."); JOHN HOLIDAY & ROBERT
S. MCPHERSON, A NAVAJO LEGACY: THE LIFE AND TEACHINGS OF JOHN HOLIDAY 39 (2005).
At one time, my father lived across the San Juan River to the north ... until the
white men started coming through there. My family was afraid of the Anglos, so
they moved back to Monument Valley. I think they should have stayed across the
river, like Mister Sakizzie and men like Bitter Water, Mister Jelly (Hastiin Jdlii),
and Old Eddie (Eddie Sini), who lived by the windmill. These men refused to
move off their land. "We were born here," they said, and stayed even when the
white men came to chase them off.... When the white men came, they told my
family that they would be handcuffed and taken away, so my family moved. But
Mister Sakizzie refused to move, and to this day, his children live there.
Id.
187. Complaint at 2-3, United States v. Tse-Kesi, 93 F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1950) (Civ. No.
1803).
188. Authorization to Bring in Other Parties Defendant at 1-2, Tse-Kesi, 93 F. Supp. 745
(Civ. No. 1803). In the order, the court stated that these "other Navajo Indians have interest in
the litigation here involved to the same extent and of the same character as that of the two record
defendants." Id. at 1.
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The case was assigned to Utah's newly appointed federal judge, Willis
Ritter.'" Because at this point in time there was but one federal judge in
Utah, Ritter would sit as judge in the later Hatahley case as well.
The attorney representing the Navajos in this case was Knox Patterson. He
would also represent them in the Hatahley case until his untimely death
shortly before the case went to trial. Born in Texas in 1890, Patterson had
been a Utah state senator from 1925 to 1933.190 Prior to that he had served as
district attorney in Moab and as a special assistant to the United States
Attorney.191 After his stint as state senator, he practiced law in Salt Lake City,
where he "was recognized as one of the leading lawyers of the state."192
I do not know how Patterson came to represent the Navajos. The Navajos
made it sound as if they retained him. They claimed that, after much
discussion amongst themselves, they made the decision to hire an attorney
(although it is not clear if this was in 1950 when the Tse-Kesi lawsuit was
filed or in 1953 when the Navajos filed their lawsuit).'93 Such a course of
action had been recommended to them by Harry Rogers, a white rancher in
Dove Creek, Colorado, who was married to one of Sakizzie's relatives.194
According to one of the plaintiffs, they "passed the hat" in order to come up
with the money to retain a lawyer."'
I do not know why the Montezuma Creek Navajos chose Patterson to
represent them. Perhaps they, or Harry Rogers, knew of him from when he
was the Grand County district attorney in neighboring Moab. Perhaps they
knew of him from one of the high-profile cases with which he had been
involved.' 96 Perhaps they knew of him from when he had earlier successfully
189. See infra text accompanying notes 356-94.
190. S.L. Attorney, Ex-Senator, Claimed at 73, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 17, 1953, at 41.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Interview with James Eddie, supra note 41; Interview with Mary Jay, supra note 41.
194. Interview with James Eddie, supra note 41; Interview with Allen Ben, Member, Navajo
Tribe, on the Navajo Reservation, San Juan County, Utah (Sept. 16, 2000).
195. Interview with Mary Jay, supra note 41.
196. For example, in 1944, he had participated in the defense of fifteen Short Creek FLDS
(Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) polygamists arrested in a raid on
their compound on the Utah-Arizona border. MARTHA SONNTAG BRADLEY, KIDNAPPED FROM
THAT LAND: THE GOVERNMENT RAIDS ON THE SHORT CREEK POLYGAMISTS 79 (1993). The
Short Creek FLDS polygamists are the same group targeted in the Texas raid on the YFZ Ranch
in 2008. Polygamist Sect Faces Charges After Raid, OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), Apr. 9,
2008, at 8A. One of his oral arguments was recounted in the Deseret News article about the
case. BRADLEY, supra, at 80 (citing Cult Decision Due Saturday: Court Will Rule on Polygamy
Charge, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), May 15, 1944, at 9).
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defended a white trader in the Aneth area from a charge of manslaughter in the
death of a Navajo.'
In any event, Patterson introduced into the litigation the issue, intriguing
but never resolved, of whether these Navajos had aboriginal rights for use of
the land.' He argued that they were "an independent band" that had
occupied the area continuously since at least 1848;'" that they had "no tribal
association of any kind with other tribes of Navajo Indians, having long since
severed any tribal relations with such Indians";200 that they never entered into
any treaty with the United States;201 and that they had their own form of
government, "having three Head Men in the area who settle all disputes and
controversies arising within the band."202 All of this sounds as if Patterson
were laying a foundation for claiming federal recognition for the separate
existence of this band.203 If the Montezuma Creek Navajos were recognized
as a separate band, then any aboriginal rights they had to the disputed land
would not have been terminated by any treaty signed by the Navajo Tribe.
Unfortunately, this issue disappears from the litigation for reasons that will be
discussed later.20"
Patterson also filed a counterclaim that anticipated the later Hatahley case.
The counterclaim alleged that government agents had wrongfully destroyed
hogans, corrals, fields, and animals belonging to the defendants during the
period of 1933 through 1950.205 It also reiterated the claim that these Navajos
"are part of a separate and independent band of Navajo Indians who have no
relations with any Indian Reservation or other band of Navajo Indians."2 06 A
pre-trial order entered in September 1950 makes it clear that the central issue
in the case, however, was whether these Navajos had any claim to the land
itself.207
197. MCPHERSON, NAVAJO LAND, supra note 43, at 59-60.
198. Answer, Affirmative Defense & Counterclaim at 1, 3-7, United States v. Tse-Kesi, 93
F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1950) (Civ. No. 1803).
199. Id. at 3.
200. Id. at 4.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 5.
203. According to one of the Navajos involved in the litigation, Patterson had said he was
going to try to have them recognized as a separate and independent band. Interview with James
Eddie, supra note 41.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 342-44.
205. Interestingly, at this time the defendants were claiming ten dollars per head for each
horse killed. Particulars Under Counterclaim at 3, Tse-Kesi, 93 F. Supp. 745 (Civ. No. 1803).
206. Id. at 1.
207. Pretrial Order at 1, Tse-Kesi, 93 F. Supp. 745 (Civ. No. 1803).
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On October 14, 1950, Judge Ritter dismissed the case.208 In his published
opinion he first noted that the defendants, the Montezuma Creek Navajos,
claimed to be an independent band and then summarized the underlying
problem as he saw it:
What the government is asking the Court to do, in short, is to force
the Indians to leave their homes and fields and grazing grounds.
But the Court has no authority to allot to the Indians any other
place to live, on or off the Reservation. In reality, the government
is asking the Court to order these Indians to become in effect
homeless Nomads.2 09
He gave three reasons for dismissing the government's request for an
injunction: first, he had no means to compel compliance with any injunction
ordering the Navajos off the range, "it being impracticable to send down the
numbers of United States Marshals necessary to patrol the territory"; second,
he had no authority to allot other lands to the Navajos; and third the parties
had not exhausted their administrative remedies.2 10 He dismissed the
counterclaim for damages to the Navajos' property because the district court
was "not the proper forum in which to seek money damages upon an Indian
claim against the United States."2 1' The government appealed to the Tenth
Circuit.2 12
b) Second Round: Young v. Felornia
While the dismissal of the federal case was being appealed, several white
ranchers filed suit in January 1951 against the Navajos in state court in Young
Now . .. the following summary of said issues is hereby made and ordered filed
herein, to-wit:
(1) [T]he issue of fact as to whether or not any of the defendants have been in
occupancy of the lands in dispute, or have been forcibly, against their will and
without right evicted from said lands ... or whether or not the defendants were on
the reservation and are now trespassing upon the lands in question.
(2) The mixed issue of law and fact as to whether or not the rights of the
Indians, if any, have been extinguished by act of the sovereign.
Id.
208. United States v. Tse-Kesi, 93 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D. Utah 1950), rev'd, 191 F.2d 518
(10th Cir. 1951).
209. Id. at 746.
210. Id. at 747.
211. Id.
212. United States v. Tse-Kesi, 191 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1951).
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v. Felornia.2 13 This case alleged that the Navajos were trespassing on grazing
leases issued on state lands.214
On August 30, 1951, the Tenth Circuit reinstated the federal lawsuit.2 15 The
Tenth Circuit held that, while there may be cases in which a court would be
justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction, ordinarily a judge has a duty
to decide cases on the merits and may not arbitrarily refuse to exercise the
court's jurisdiction.2 16 Judge Ritter then stayed the case at the district-court
level until the resolution of the Utah state court case.2"
In September 1951, the state district court ruled that the Navajos had no
aboriginal grazing rights and enjoined them from trespassing on state lands.
The Navajos appealed to the Utah Supreme Court,218 which upheld the lower
court's decision in May 1952.219 A petition for rehearing was filed and denied
in July 1952.22o A petition for certiorari was then filed in October and denied
in November.22'
From the point of view of some of the white stockmen, the matter was
resolved by the Utah Supreme Court decision in May 1952. During the spring
213. 244 P.2d 862, 863 (Utah 1952).
214. At statehood, Utah, like most of the western states, was allocated lands within the
boundary of the state to be used by the state to generate funds for public education. These lands
were not contiguous, but were scattered over the territory ofthe state in a checkerboard pattern.
These lands are commonly referred to as state lands or state trust lands. The checkerboard
pattern has presented the states with a challenge in the administration of the lands. See LINCOLN
INST. OF LAND POLICY, UTAH TRUST LANDS AND EDUCATION FUNDING 1 (2007), available at
http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/managing-state-trust-lands/state/ed-funding-ut.pdf.
215. Tse-Kesi, 191 F.2d at 521.
216. Id. at 520.
217. See Order at 2, United States v. Tse-Kesi, 93 F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1953) (Civ. No.
1803). Oddly enough, the federal lawsuit remained ongoing until June 27, 1953, which was
subsequent to the filing of the Hatahley lawsuit. On that date, Ritter entered an order again
dismissing the suit as moot, "it appearing to the Court upon representation by representatives
of Bureau of Land Management that the defendants have returned to the Reservation and that
there are no more trespasses." Id. at 3. Testimony at the first trial in Hatahley, which would
occur in the fall of 1953, would establish that at least some of the defendants remained on the
public range. See, e.g., First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 194-95.
218. At the time, Utah had no intermediate appellate court. The Utah Court of Appeals was
created in 1987. Utah State Courts, Overview of the Court of Appeals, http://www.utcourts.
gov/courts/appell/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
219. Young v. Felornia, 244 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1952).
220. CHRONOLOGY, supra note 169, at 4.




No. 1] HATAHLEY: A LEGAL ARCHAEOLOGY CASE STUDY
and early summer of 1952, tensions increased. By July 1952, enforcement
action against the Navajos had begun.
In the middle of July, probably the 13th, the sheriff tried to impound horses
and sheep belonging to Tom Mustash and some other Navajos. When word
came that the white men were rounding up their stock, the Navajos intervened
and herded the stock away from the whites.222 The next day, seven of them
were told to go to the San Juan County seat, Monticello, and spent the night
in jail.223
A few days later, on July 16, the deputy sheriff and three stockmen tried to
impound another flock ofNavaj o sheep grazing on private land.224 As the men
were driving the sheep to the waiting trucks, several Navajo men and women
surrounded the sheep to prevent their being loaded. A scuffle broke out. Two
Navajo men were handcuffed together, but the others managed to prevent the
sheep from being loaded.225
The deputy sheriff returned to the town of Blanding for reinforcements; he
returned with the sheriff and several more men. They tried to impound yet
another herd, and the women herding this flock tried to prevent them from
doing so. The sheriff handcuffed four of them together until the loading had
been completed.22 6 One of the women had a babe in arms. She had been to
school, and she started swearing at the men in English. "Thatjust made things
worse." 2 7 There was some more pushing and shoving, the four handcuffed
women got pushed on the ground, 2 8 and the deputy sheriff ended up with a
broken finger and had his badge torn from his shirt.229
Starting in September 1952, the BLM range manager for the district and the
white ranchers on the advisory board for the federal grazing district hit on the
idea of using the Utah Abandoned Horses Act tojustify seizing and destroying
the Navajo horses.23 0 They would locate a herd, wait until any Navajos in the
222. Transcript of Proceedings at 205-07, United States v. Hatahley, No. C-36-53 (D. Utah
Apr. 5, 1957) [hereinafter Second Trial Transcript].
223. Id. at 207.
224. Memorandum from Dee Black, Range Aide, BLM & Robert C. Krumm, Range
Manager, BLM, to Range Manager, BLM at 3 (July 21, 1952) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit
11, Hatahley, No. C-36-53) [hereinafter Memo July 1952].
225. Second Trial Transcript, supra note 222, at 327-28.
226. Memo July 1952, supra note 224, at 3.
227. Interview of Rose Sakizzie, supra note 41.
228. Id.
229. Memo July 1952, supra note 224, at 3.
230. Although the Act did not require actual abandonment, at trial government witnesses
damaged their credibility with Ritter by swearing that they did not know the owners of the
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vicinity had left, and then seize the so-called abandoned horses. There was
testimony at trial that they even placed a sentry to watch Sakizzie's corral
from a bluff until his horses were let out to graze; they waited until the horses
wandered over the next ridge, and then they rounded them up.231
The horses were then driven to a corral, loaded on trucks and taken to either
Blanding or Monticello. In the process, some horses were maimed or killed.
The rest were then sold to a packing plant within a short time, usually days.
If a Navajo managed to track his or her horses to town before this occurred
and tried to redeem them, he or she was either intimidated into giving up the
horse, or was told that the redemption fee was a large sum. This went on until
February and March of 1953, when the Navajos filed suit and Judge Ritter
entered an injunction prohibiting the BLM from initiating further roundups.
From this point in time onward, the legal wrangling is documented in the
Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court opinions discussed above.
II. The Problem of Cross-Cultural Damages
[W]e are dealing with a people who do not think about the value
of a horse in terms of what we know as value, and somehow we
have got to translate their term about that into our own
232conception ....
As the Hatahley case features prominently in the remedies canon, the next
section will focus on the damages issues in the case. In the litigation, the
challenge oftrying to compute damages across cultures caused problems. Judge
Ritter was sensitive to these problems, as is revealed by comments he made
during the first trial.233 Yet his attempt to translate the Navajos' injuries into
dollars and cents was unsuccessful, at least from the vantage of the appellate
courts.
horses. See, e.g., First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 572-73. Ritter noted: "[W]hen these
fellows say they didn't know they were running off Indian horses. I just don't believe it. And
I observed their conduct on the witness stand. They were evasive." Id. at 572.
231. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 117-18, 197-200.
232. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 365-66 (quoting Ritter, J.).
233. Some examples: After noting that owners can testify as to the fair market value of their
possessions, he says of the Navajos, "I don't know whether they would understand what 'fair
market value' is. . . ." First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 355. "[S]omehow we have got
to translate their term about [the value of a horse] into our own conception . . .. " Id. at 365-66.
"I have to know what is the value of those horses in money. Now, I know that is a troublesome
thing." Id. at 368.
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After the first trial, the Judge Ritter made extensive findings of fact.2 34 These
findings included "that there is no reasonable market value among white men for
an Indian raised and trained horse"; "that the reasonable market value of a white
man's horse of average quality was $300.00 per head"; that the plaintiffs did not
sell their horses but bartered them for cows or sheep; that it would take the
plaintiffs "not less than five years" to raise colts to replace the horses they had
lost at a replacement cost of one thousand dollars each; and that the rental value
of horses was five dollars per day.235 In awarding judgment to the plaintiffs,
Judge Ritter indicated that the plaintiffs' damages included "consequential
damages, mental pain and suffering and the loss of the value of their horses and
burros" but merely awarded them the amount requested in their complaint,
$100,000, without further elaboration or breakdown of the damages into their
constituent parts.236 Indeed, in his findings, Judge Ritter did not even indicate
how many horses or burros each of the plaintiffs had lost.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found no liability and thus had no need to
review the damages award, although the court did state "that the amount of the
judgment appears to be more for punishment because of the methods used in
eliminating the animals, rather than for the damages suffered."2 37 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit on the issue of liability,
holding that the plaintiffs' complaint did state a claim under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.2 38 On the issue of damages, the Court reiterated the black-letter law
by stating that an award ofdamages must be made with "sufficient particularity"
so that it may be reviewed.239 The Court then stated:
Here the District Court merely awarded the amount prayed for in the
complaint. There was no attempt to allot any particular sum to any
of the 30 plaintiffs, who owned varying numbers of horses and
burros. There can be no apportionment of the award among the
petitioners unless it be assumed that the horses were valued equally,
the burros equally, and some assumption is made as to the
consequential damages and pain and suffering of each petitioner.
234. The court's findings of fact cover twenty-two legal-size pages. Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law, Hatahley v. United States, No. C-36-53 (D. Utah Jan. 22, 1954)
[hereinafter Findings (1954)].
235. Id. at 20.
236. Id. at 26.
237. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley 1), 220 F.2d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 1955), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
238. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181 (1956).
239. Id. at 182.
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These assumptions cannot be made in the absence of pertinent
findings, and the findings here are totally inadequate for review.24
The Court then remanded the case to the district court for further findings on the
question of damages.241
On remand, Judge Ritter took additional evidence and at the conclusion of
this second trial made further findings of fact. Because this second trial was
limited by Ritter to the sole issue of consequential damages, the findings take up
the bulk of the court's judgment: thirty-nine pages of findings of fact versus one
page of conclusions of law.242 The number of animals found to have been
destroyed varied slightly from the first trial: 101 horses and 39 burros.243
This second time around, the trial court awarded compensation for three
elements of damages: the value of the animals destroyed; the deprivation of use;
and mental pain and suffering. The court awarded $395 per head for the horses
and burros;2" fifty percent of the value of the reduction in the size of each
plaintiff's herd of other livestock as an approximation of the value of the loss of
use of the destroyed stock;245 and $3500 per plaintiff for mental pain and
suffering.246
On appeal from the second trial-court judgment, the Tenth Circuit accepted
the three elements as appropriate for the award of damages, but criticized and
rejected the district court's findings as to the amount of damages for each.247 In
reviewing the Tenth Circuit's opinion in light of the trial transcripts and
Findings of Fact, I am of the opinion that the Tenth Circuit was wrong to reject
the trial judge's findings as to the value of the destroyed animals, but that it
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Findings (1957), supra note 40.
243. Id. at 5. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the first trial do not include
any information about how many horses and burros, in total or individually, were destroyed.
Findings (1954), supra note 234. At trial, the number of destroyed animals was given as 116
horses and 38 burros. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 365. No explanation is given in
the second set of Findings for the difference.
244. Findings (1957), supra note 40, at 4.
245. Id. at 17.
246. Id. at 14-15.
247. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley fl), 257 F.2d 920, 924-25 (10th Cir. 1958). The
court did express some hesitation about the appropriateness in this case of damages for pain and
suffering. It noted that such damages are awarded "only in extreme cases." It then hinted that
it suspected the trial court had awarded pain-and-suffering damages more for the general
harassment of the plaintiffs than for the specific removal of the horses and burros by cautioning
that such damages in this case must relate to the wrongful taking of the plaintiffs' animals and
nothing else. Id. at 925.
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correctly rejected the formula used to compute the value of the loss ofuse ofthe
horses and burros. As to the third element, compensation for pain and suffering,
the Tenth Circuit was justified in light of the state of the law at that time to
reject the award for communal pain and suffering-but it failed to rise to the
ethical challenge of reconceptualizing harm to account for the cultural
differences between the plaintiffs and Western society.
Before examining each element in detail, it is helpful to outline the standard
of review employed by appellate courts. An appellate court is supposed to
review findings of fact by a trial judge under the clearly erroneous standard.
This is out of deference to the trial judge's ability to gauge the credibility of
witnesses testifying in court. Conclusions of law, however, are subject to de
novo review. Thus, on the second appeal the Tenth Circuit would primarily be
reviewing findings of fact, as liability had been established in the course of the
first trial and the first set of appeals. It is expected that, although the Tenth
Circuit was found to be wrong when it held no liability existed, the court would
be able to set aside what the Supreme Court held was an erroneous view of the
case and look at the damages issue as if the court had no reservations about
liability at all.248
A. The Value of the Destroyed Animals
The question of how to value the horses and burros taken from the Navajos
was the central factual issue in the first trial.249 Although during the first trial
there was some disagreement between the parties as to the exact number of
animals involved,250 before testimony in the five-day trial was concluded the two
sides had agreed to stipulate as to the numbers: 116 horses and 38 burros. 251' The
two sides were unable, however, to agree on the value of these animals.
In the first trial, it was established that the majority of the animals had been
shipped to the Kuhni Packing Plant between the Utah towns of Springville and
Provo.252 The animals were sold to the packing plant for three cents per pound,
which means that a five-hundred-pound horse would have been sold for fifteen
248. Perhaps this is asking too much of the human mind.
249. The central legal question was whether the BLM had the authority to eradicate the
stock.
250. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 347-48.
251. Id. at 365. But see Findings (1957), supra note 40, at 5 (giving the total number as 101
horses and 39 burros).
252. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 130.
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dollars.25' The money received from the packing plant, a total of $1700, went
to the Advisory Board for the Grazing District.25 4
Several defense witnesses testified as to the market value of the destroyed
horses. One of the many ways that the BLM range aide undermined his
credibility with Judge Ritter was by testifying that, while the BLM received
three cents per pound upon sale of the horses and burros for slaughter, the
market value of the animals was only two cents a pound.255 An expert witness
for the defendants in the first trial testified that the average cost of a saddle horse
in the area was from $100 to $150, and that the stock rounded up by the BLM
were below-average in quality.256 In addition, the defendant's witnesses testified
that the animals rounded up were mostly unbroken-an assertion that was flatly
denied by the plaintiffs' witnesses.257
The plaintiffs' expert witness, a horse dealer, testified that the market value
of a "good bred use horse" in the area at the time of the roundup would be from
$250 to $350.258 Individual Navajos also testified as to the value of their horses,
but this evidence was inconsistent2 " and difficult to understand, plagued both
253. Id. at 136. The BLM range aide testified that the horses shipped to the packing plant
were "very small horses" weighing about 500 pounds each and that the BLM received three
cents per pound. Id.
254. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 176 (1956).
255. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 135-36. The three-cents-per-pound figure was
for the animals delivered to the plant, so perhaps the range aide was subtracting a penny on the
theory that it reflected a delivery charge.
256. Id. at 517. Ritter would not allow the witness to testify as to the market value of the
horses he saw, as the witness did not know whether the horses were Navajo horses or white or
Paiute/Ute horses that were also rounded up. The government made a proffer that the witness
would testify that twenty dollars a head was a fair market price for the horses he saw. Id. at 522.
257. Compare id. at 136 (range aide testifies horses were "small, unbroke horses, most of
them poor in flesh") with id. at 307 (plaintiff testifies, "These were all gentle horses, usable
horses.").
258. Id. at 435.
259. Sakizzie, for example, testified that he would take five cows or twenty-five to thirty-five
sheep in exchange for a horse and that a cow was worth about $200 and a ewe about $30. Id
at 370-71. This would indicate that he would take other animals worth from $750 to $1050 for
a horse. But he also testified that he would sell a horse like those taken for $300. Id. at 371.
As a further complication, during the second trial, the findings of fact indicate that a cow was
worth $300; I suspect this was a typographical error, as both the trial testimony and findings
from the first trial indicated the number was $200. See Findings (1954), supra note 234, at 20.
The court was thus faced with inconsistent testimony from the same witness. Id. at 373.
According to the interpreter, what Sakizzie was getting at with the $300 cash figure for a horse
was an average value for all the horses taken, including colts. Id. at 374.
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by translation difficulties and, I suspect, by the fact that the Navajos rarely sold
their animals and thus had little basis for discovering their "market" value.26
The strategy of the plaintiffs' attorney was to show that these animals had an
idiosyncratic value that went beyond any "market" value. To establish the
idiosyncratic value, witnesses testified as to the unique "endurance" training the
animals received.2 6' Because the Navajos could not afford to provide feed for
their stock, their animals had to be able to survive on what grazing was
available, which in drought years would be hardly any and even in wet years
would be barely enough for survival due to the fact that the range was
overgrazed. Thus, in training their animals the Navajos would tie them to a tree
without food or water for up to three days.262
Testimony relating to the religious significance of the animals was also
introduced. The plaintiffs' witnesses testified that when a person dies, Navajos
kill the person's best horse, so that he or she is mounted in the next life.263
Finally, there was testimony regarding how central horses and burros were to the
Navajos' ability to survive. There was testimony about how the animals were
used in herding sheep, hauling water, hunting, gathering pinyon nuts, pulling
plows in their fields, and providing mobility-especially to the elderly members
of the community.2
At the second trial, Judge Ritter refused to allow any testimony from either
party that went to the animals' value, limiting testimony to consequential
damages.265 In Judge Ritter's view of things, the value of the destroyed animals
had been determined at the first trial and upheld by the United States Supreme
Court when it held generally that the findings of the trial judge were not invalid
as a consequence of bias.26
Nevertheless, Judge Ritter made specific findings in the second trial
regarding the average value of the animals taken. He justified the use of an
average value as follows:
260. As Judge Ritter noted: "Now, of course, we are dealing with a people who do not think
about the value of a horse in terms of what we know as value, and somehow we have got to
translate their term about that into our own conception . . . ." Id at 365-66.
261. Id. at 288-89.
262. E.g., id.
263. E.g., id. at 204-05, 301.
264. E.g., id. at 202-04; see also Findings (1954), supra note 234, at 7.
265. See, e.g., Second Trial Transcript, supra note 222, at 2, 112-13, 196.
266. Id.; see also Hatahleyv. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 177 n.3 (1956) (finding that the
trial was not "conducted so improperly as to vitiate [the trial court's] findings"). But see United
Statesv. Hatahley (Hatahley II), 257 F.2d 920, 925 (10thCir. 1958) (court's statement does not
apply to factual findings regarding damages).
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It would be impractical to attempt to place a separate valuation on
each of the 140 animals taken by the Government. For that reason,
the Court's findings must be based upon an overall average, taking
into consideration the market value at the time of the taking, the
replacement cost, and the intrinsic value derived from the unique
nature of the animals involved. On this basis, the Court finds an
average fair valuation per horse or burro taken of $395.00 per
head.267
The Findings then recited that Navajos would trade five cows or twenty-five to
thirty-five head of sheep for a good horse; cows had a market value of $300 a
head and sheep had a value of about $30 a head, giving a value of approximately
$1000 for a horse; if Sakizzie had sold horses, which he did not, he would have
taken $300 a head; the horse dealer's estimate was $250 to $350 for a stock
horse; rental value was $5 a day; and specifically "[t]he replacement cost of a
horse of the type taken from the plaintiffs would be about $1,000.00 a head." 2 68
The Findings then elaborate on the replacement cost:
The horses were original Indian stock hardened by breeding and
environment to the rigors of the area and the Indian way of life.
Only such horses can survive in this area. Horses which might be
purchased and brought into the area will run away or die of hunger
unless given special care. In order to replace the stock taken by the
Government agents, it will be necessary to buy brood mares and
keep them in an enclosure and feed them hay until colts from these
mares can be raised to a size to be used in the range area.... The
actual replacement cost of the plaintiffs' horses would be at least
$1,000.00. None of the plaintiffs have the present means to replace
the horses taken from them.269
A list of the individual plaintiffs with the number of horses and burros taken
from each is included.270
On appeal from the second trial, the Tenth Circuit considered itself free to
review all of Ritter's findings as to damages:
267. Findings (1957), supra note 40, at 4.
268. Id. at 1-2. Judge Ritter's finding that cows had a market value of $300 may be a
typographical error. See supra note 259.
269. Findings (1957), supra note 40, at 3.
270. Id. at 4-5.
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In our former opinion we had occasion to make some observations
concerning the conduct of the trial. The Supreme Court referred to
these observations on the bias and prejudice of the presiding Judge,
and said that the trial was not so improperly conducted as to vitiate
the findings. This statement did not relate to any of the findings as
to damages which are under consideration here.2 '
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion is debatable, however. The Supreme Court sent
the case back for further findings as to damages due to a lack of particularity, not
because the findings as to value (for example, the finding as to the market value
of horses and burros) were improperly determined. In other words, the Supreme
Court did not say that Ritter's findings as to market value were invalid; it said
that the damages were not individualized as to each plaintiff. The Supreme
Court's opinion could be read as approving the finding as to market value of an
average animal, but critiquing the trial court for failing to determine whether
each animal lost was at, above, or below average. Nevertheless, the Tenth
Circuit reviewed all aspects of damages, including the value of the destroyed
animals.
As damages for the destroyed animals, the Tenth Circuit held that "the
plaintiffs were entitled to the market value, or replacement cost, of their horses
and burros as of the time of taking." 272 Note that the Tenth Circuit seems to be
equating market value with replacement cost. Certainly, in many cases,
particularly where there is a functioning market in whatever is sought to be
evaluated, market value and replacement cost are one and the same: where there
is a functioning market, one can replace the lost item by purchasing another on
the market. In this case, however, there was no functioning "market" for Indian
horses or burros, and thus "market value" for the animals taken is difficult to
determine.
The Tenth Circuit then goes on to state: "The plaintiffs did not prove the
replacement cost of the animals, but relied upon a theory that the animals taken
were unique because of their peculiar nature and training, and could not be
replaced."2 73  This seems to ignore the finding quoted above that the
replacement cost would be at least one thousands dollars. More surprisingly in
view of that finding, the court then states that "[n]o consideration was given to
replacement cost."274 The Tenth Circuit goes on to explain in particular where,
271. Hatahley II, 257 F.2d at 925 (emphasis added).
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in its view, the trial court stumbled, stating, "The court rejected evidence of the
availability of like animals in the immediate vicinity, and their value. This, we
think, was error."275
It is not completely clear what the Tenth Circuit meant when it said the trial
court "rejected evidence" regarding the availability of other animals.2 7 6 I
suspect this refers to evidence that the government tried to introduce on a
number of occasions during both trials about a BIA program that sought to
reduce through voluntary relinquishment the number of horses on the Navajo
Reservation by offering up to ten dollars for each horse turned in.277
Judge Ritter allowed testimony about the horse-reduction program at the first
trial.278 He also allowed rebuttal testimony that the horses turned in under this
program were old, useless animals, not horses that would replace the working
stock lost by the plaintiffs.279 During the second trial, however, Ritter would not
allow this testimony, due to his view that the value of the horses had been
established at the first trial.280
If by saying the trial court rejected evidence of the availability of other
animals the Tenth Circuit meant that Judge Ritter heard evidence and rejected
it as not credible, then the appellate court's decision would seem to run afoul of
the correct standard of review. Judge Ritter heard the conflicting testimony and
found the testimony of the plaintiffs to be more credible. 281' He made no specific
275. Id.
276. The parties' briefs on appeal no doubt would throw light on this, but unfortunately at
this time I have not been able to locate the appellate briefs.
277. E.g., First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 305,451; Second Trial Transcript, supra
note 222, at 59, 112, 125.
278. E.g., First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 305-06.
279. Id.
280. Second Trial Transcript, supra note 222, at 112.
281. I do not think it is fair to accuse Ritter of reflexively believing the Navajos over the
government witnesses. While that may have been the case, the record gives ample reason for
the trier of fact to call into question the veracity, and thus credibility, of the government
witnesses. Reference has already been made to the testimony from the range aide that he sold
the horses for meat at three cents per pound, but that the market value was two cents per pound.
See First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 135-36. In addition, the range aide categorically
denied having watched the release of Sakizzie's horses from his corral prior to rounding them
up, see id. at 117, while the BLM's own files, put into evidence in the case, contain a letter from
a rancher who wrote that the range aide did exactly that. See Memorandum from Dale H.
Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'1 Adm'r, Div. of Range Mgmt. (Nov. 13, 1952)
(contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, Hatahley v. United States, No. C-36-53 (D. Utah Jan. 22,
1954)) (enclosing a letter dated Nov. 10, 1952 from Leland W. Redd, a prominent San Juan
County rancher, to Wilford M. Burton, a Salt Lake City attorney). The same witness testified
that he had no problems personally with the Navajos. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at
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finding that the horse-reduction program was irrelevant, but that is the
reasonable conclusion to draw from his remarks at the time that evidence was
admitted.282 Ordinarily, the appellate court ought to defer to the trial judge who
had the chance to view the demeanor of the witnesses and is thus in the best
position to assess their credibility. Accordingly, a trial judge's findings of fact
should be overturned on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous, that is,
lacking in any evidentiary support. Judge Ritter's finding that the replacement
cost for the lost horses was approximately one thousand dollars had evidentiary
support.
All of this suggests that it is more likely the Tenth Circuit was saying the trial
judge rejected evidence in the sense of refusing to hear evidence. As noted,
however, Judge Ritter did allow this evidence at the first trial, although not at
the second. This raises the question of whether the appellate court was relying
solely on the record from the second trial at this point.283
The Tenth Circuit appears to have either disregarded the appropriate standard
of review for factual findings or overlooked the relevant testimony at the first
trial while only noting the instances in the second trial where Ritter excluded the
same testimony. In either case, it was wrong for the Tenth Circuit to reject
Ritter's findings of fact due to an alleged failure to consider replacement cost.
B. Deprivation of Use
The plaintiffs suffered harm occasioned by the loss of their stock. As the
Tenth Circuit stated:
122. But this testimony was contradicted by testimony from several plaintiffs about run-ins they
had had with him, leading Judge Ritter to comment that such testimony "is directed to the
credibility of [the range aide]. He said he had no trouble with these people at all." Id. at 184.
Moreover, the government's witnesses continually insisted that the abandoned-horse program
was not targeting Indian livestock. See, e.g., id. at 78-80, 487. As Ritter noted:
One of the things that has been interesting in this lawsuit is how little everyone
has ever heard about these Indians down there, no problems with the Indian
livestock, we just have a general program to eliminate abandoned horses. It does
not concern the Indians.
Now, somebody isn't being exactly frank with the Court about that.
Id. at 491-92; see infra note 413 (commenting on racial silences).
282. See First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 305 (Judge Ritter commenting that the
horses available through the program "are not first-class horses .... [b]ut. . . are still eating up
forage").
283. This would be ironic, given that in other instances the appellate court seems to have
relied solely on the record from the first trial. See infra text accompanying notes 428-31. But
again, without the briefs it is impossible to know what had been argued to the appellate court
and thus whether the fault should be ascribed to the lawyers and not the court.
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[T]he loss of their animals made it difficult and burdensome for them
to obtain and transport needed water, wood, food, and game, and
curtailed their travel for medical care and to tribal council meetings
and ceremonies. Plaintiffs also testified that because of the loss of
their animals they were not able to grow crops and gardens as
extensively as before. These were factors upon which damages for
loss of use could have been based."
The court also noted that plaintiffs could recover for loss of profits due to a
reduction in the size of their flocks of sheep and goats caused by the loss of their
horses or for the actual loss of animals due to their inability to care properly for
their flocks without horses.285
To prove the dollar equivalent of all of this would be difficult, even for a
member of Anglo society. To do so for the Navajos would be nearly impossible.
How, for example, does one attach a dollar amount to someone's inability to
attend a distant "sing" or ceremony? Is it the cost of renting horses to get there,
even though the Navajos had no money to do so and might have had trouble
obtaining horses even if they did have the money available?
To address this problem, the Findings of Fact set out a formula used to
approximate a dollar value for loss of use.286 The Findings note that the local
trader testified that the Navajos' credit at the trading post, an amount based on
the size of their flocks, had been cut in half since the taking of their horses.287
The Findings also note that the area had been in the grip of a drought for several
years.288 The Findings then state:
Taking into consideration other factors which may have contributed
to the reduction in size of the plaintiffs' herds, the Court finds that
a fair measure of the consequential damages resulting from such
deprivation of use [of their horses] would be approximately fifty
percent of the difference between the dollar value of the plaintiffs'
herds of sheep, goats, and cattle at the time the horses were taken,
and the dollar value of the same herds at the time of the Court's
hearing in October and November, 1956.289
284. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley II), 257 F.2d 920, 924 (10th Cir. 1958).
285. Id.
286. Findings (1957), supra note 40, at 17.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 16.
289. Id. at 17.
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Then, no doubt due to the Supreme Court opinion requiring individual findings,
the Findings list each of the plaintiffs, the size of their herds at the time of the
roundup of the horses and burros, their size at the time of trial, and the dollar
equivalent of that reduction, divided in half.290
The Tenth Circuit lambastes this formula as erroneous for two reasons. First,
it held as a matter of law that, in the case of herd reductions caused by a
defendant's unlawful acts, the proper measure of damages is the loss of profits,
not the overall reduction in value of the herd.29 ' I question whether this is
appropriate, given that, although the Navajos sold off some lambs each year, at
least half of their sheep and all of their goats were kept for their personal use as
a source of food and wool.292 A rule using profits to be made from the flock
would be appropriate as a measure of damages where the flock is raised for sale,
but not necessarily where the flock is kept for personal use.
Second, the court rejects the Ritter formula as "arbitrary, pure speculation,
and clearly erroneous."293 Here, I agree with the Tenth Circuit. There were so
many other factors aside from the loss of their horses and burros that were
causing reductions in flock size that the fifty-percent formula seems as if it were
pulled out of the air.29 Moreover, the fifty percent of the reduced value of the
flock is being asked to stand in for other things that are unrelated to flock size,
such as a reduction in the size of the Navajos' gardens and their inability to
travel to collect pinyon nuts and hunt deer and elk.295
The plaintiffs possibly could have used the rental value of a horse, an amount
given in uncontroverted testimony as five dollars a day, as a basis for computing
loss of use. The problem with that, however, would be the question of how long
the plaintiffs were entitled to receive that amount. The Tenth Circuit made a
point of stating that damages for loss of use can not extend forever: "[1]t is
limited to the time in which a prudent person would replace the destroyed horses
and burros."296 That would bring the court back to the issue of whether the
plaintiffs were able to obtain replacements for the destroyed horses and burros.
290. Id. at 22-40.
291. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley II), 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958).
292. See, e.g., Second Trial Transcript, supra note 222, at 25-26 (featuring testimony by
Sakizzie that he sold "[j]ust a few lambs" every fall and killed sheep and goats for food); id. at
130 (containing testimony by Sakizzie that he sold about half of his lamb crop each year
"[bjefore his horses were taken").
293. Hatahley II, 257 F.2d at 924.
294. If this had been a jury trial, a jury possibly could have used such a formula without
challenge, but in a bench trial the judge must give reasons for the judgment rendered.
295. Findings (1957), supra note 40, at 18-20.
296. Hatahley II, 257 F.2d at 924.
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C Pain and Suffering
On the topic of pain and suffering, the case presents two interesting issues.
The first, which is specific to the facts of this case, is whether an award for pain
and suffering due to the loss of their horses and burros was appropriate when the
plaintiffs testified that in dire circumstances they would eat the horses. The
second, which has a broader jurisprudential aspect, is whether the law should
recognize the concept of communal pain and suffering.
The testimony about the Navajos' reliance on and fondness for their horses
took an unexpected turn. After explaining how the loss of his horse was like a
death in the family and how his wife had her favorite horse,297 one witnesses
then added, almost as an afterthought, that they could eat the horses too.298
Looked at from one perspective, the juxtaposition of a "personal"
relationship with a potential meal seems blackly humorous. Looked at from
another perspective, however, it is a striking reminder ofthe cultural differences
involved in this case. As best as can be gleaned from a "cold" record, it seems
the witness found nothing unusual in the concept of eating what he had just
described almost as a family pet-but the witness was speaking from a world
view that is far removed from Black Beauty and other sentimental
representations of animals.
The government's lawyers used this incongruity as a basis for attacking the
judge's findings of fact from the second trial. They argued that, in justifying the
award of damages for pain and suffering, the judge erred "[i]n finding that the
plaintiffs had a filial-type love for their horses . . . in the face of plaintiffs'
admissions, and the stipulation oftheir counsel, that the plaintiffs engaged in the
practice of eating their horses."2" The latter does not preclude the former. Even
white farm families have shared this perspective. In the memoirs of an eastern
woman who married an Idaho rancher, she recounts how she had nursed a three-
legged lamb and given it the name of Limpy; one day she cooked dinner, never
considering where the lamb came from until one of her children asked, "Gi'me
some more Limpy, please!" 
On the issue ofcommunal pain and suffering, Judge Ritter did something that
was quite remarkable and, I think, very sensitive to the realities ofthe plaintiffs'
lives. After noting that it was "evident that each and all of the plaintiffs
sustained mental pain and suffering" and that it was "not possible for the extent
297. Second Trial Transcript, supra note 222, at 129.
298. Id. at 134-35.
299. Appellant's Statement of Points on Appeal at 3, Hatahley II, 257 F.2d 920 (No. 5717).
300. ANNIE PIKE GREENWOOD, WE SAGEBRUSH FOLKS 77 (1934).
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of the mental pain and suffering to be separately evaluated as to each individual
plaintiff," the court found as follows: "The mental pain and suffering sustained
was a thing common to all of the plaintiffs. It was a community loss and a
community sorrow shared by all.""o' Traditional Navajo life is much more
centered on the group than is common in American society.302 Thus, conceiving
of the mental pain and suffering as a community injury was very much in accord
with traditional Navajo world-views.
The Tenth Circuit categorically rejected this understanding ofthe case: "Pain
and suffering is a personal and individual matter, not a common injury, and must
be so treated."303 The contrast between two world-views could not be more stark
or more starkly articulated. The overriding importance of community in the
Navajo world-view stands in contrast to the determinedly individualistic world-
view of American political science, as articulated by the Tenth Circuit. The
question is not whether one world view is "better" than the other; the question
is why the law is unable to recognize both as valid and award compensation
accordingly.
Interestingly, a similar argument regarding the existence of a compensable
communal loss was raised under very different circumstances in an event
referred to as the "Buffalo Creek Disaster."3" In that case, a mining-company
dam in West Virginia failed in 1972, unleashing a flood that destroyed several
rural communities along Buffalo Creek. Over one hundred individuals perished,
mostly women and children.30 A lawsuit was brought on behalf of some six
hundred residents, 3" most of whom had suffered no physical injuries,30 had not
been caught in the flood waters, and had not seen anyone die; indeed, some were
not even in the valley that day.30s The plaintiffs' attorneys brought in experts to
make their case for damages arising from the mental suffering caused by the
destruction of the plaintiffs'community and argued that everyone in the
301. Findings (1957), supra note 40, at 14.
302. E.g., TRIMBLE, supra note 41, at 189 (quoting a Navajo woman, who says her
grandmother taught her that "[w]ithout your family, you were nothing. She taught me to be
there for all my family"; quoting a Navajo man who says that "when you give a paycheck to a
Native American[,] it's supporting a lot of people"). Recall that the Hatahley plaintiffs were
all interrelated by blood, marriage, or clan. See supra text accompanying notes 46 and 69-70.
303. Hatahley II, 257 F.2d at 925.
304. GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: THE STORY OF THE SURVIVORS'
UNPRECEDENTED LAwsurr (1976).
305. Id. at ix.
306. Id. at 185.
307. Id. at 60.
308. Id. at 110.
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community was entitled to consequential damages for this "collective trauma."30
It was argued that the destruction of their community meant more to these rural
coal miners who survived through the support of "tightly knit communal
groups""o--analogous in many ways to the social structure of the Navajo clans.
The case, however, settled before a jury had the opportunity to evaluate the
claims.311
The destruction of the Montezuma Creek Navajos' horses and burros was
meant to drive them from their homes on the public range. It was an attack on
their community. This attack was as much a "collective trauma" as the
destruction of the coal miners' community. Twenty years before the dam failed
on Buffalo Creek, Judge Ritter had sought to remedy a similar communal loss.
III. "Processing" the Narrative: Law and Racial Conflict
Law ... is much more closely related to our social, economic and
political thinking than we are in the habit of believing.. . . [L]aw
conforms to community standards. It is what we make it. Much in
it that is subject to criticism is merely a reflection of the law ideals
ofyou and me and the community at large.3 12
A. Racialized Power Structures
In this section, I investigate the "social structures of power" that predate,
extend beyond, and outlast the particularities of the grazing dispute at the heart
of this case. The most significant of these structures is that of race.
The controversy between the Navajo herders and the white ranchers was
more than just a dispute over access to resources. The history ofthe West is full
of stories of conflict over resources: between ranchers and homesteaders,
between cattlemen and sheepmen. With regard to this conflict, however, racial
issues simmered below the surface of the San Juan County range war and on
occasion bubbled to the surface.
309. Id. at 212.
310. Id. at 213.
311. Id. at 269. The claims of thirty-three plaintiffs who were not present when the dam
broke, however, survived a motion to dismiss. Id. at 248.
312. Willis W. Ritter, Law and Social Progress, Lecture 8: Our Changing Social World (Feb.
11, 1932), quoted in PATRICIA F. COWLEY & PARKER M. NIELSON, THUNDER OVER ZION: THE
LIFE OF CHIEF JUDGE WILLIs W. RrITER 51-52 (2007).
52 [Vol. 34
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss1/1
No. I] HATAHLEY: A LEGAL ARCHAEOLOGY CASE STUDY
For instance, it is difficult to read through the case files, particularly the BLM
files,"' and not be upset by the casual racism they contain. It is difficult from
this remove to determine whether these comments reflect the generalized
"background" prejudice of the times, a discriminatory intent specific to the
individual, or both.
The sympathy of the BLM agents in San Juan County was decidedly in favor
of the white ranchers.314 This is not surprising as the BLM agents saw the
ranchers as their primary constituents."' There are many examples in the files,
however, of a more pointed and very mean-spirited disparagement of individual
Navajos and Navajo culture in general. There are memoranda ridiculing the way
the Navajos spoke English and making them the butt of jokes.3 16 There are
memos questioning their integrity.' The memoranda consistently refer to
"bucks" and "squaws" when speaking of the Navajos."' I suspect the range
manager for the area, the author of most of the memoranda contained in the file,
had a particular bias against Navajos. But the fact that he felt free to include his
comments in an official government file arguably reflects a generalized,
background prejudice.
313. Plaintiffs' Exhibits 8, 11, 12, and 13 are files labeled "United States Department of the
Interior, Official File/Grazing Service/Trespass/4 Grazing/Navaho Indians/Utah No. 6" or a
slight variation thereof. According to a colloquy on the record at the first trial, the original files
were received into evidence with the understanding that copies would be made and the originals
returned to the BLM. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 565-66, 585-86. The exhibits in
the court file at the National Archives, however, look suspiciously like they are the original
agency files.
314. Id. at 261.
315. It has been claimed that "in the 1950s the BLM was a virtual captive of grazing
interests." Greeno, supra note 108, at 52.
316. See, e.g., Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Dist. Grazier, BLM, to Reg'1 Adm'r,
Branch of Range Mgmt., BLM at 2 (Aug. 31, 1948) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 13,
Hatahley v. United States, No. C-36-53 (D. Utah Jan. 22, 1954)) [hereinafter Kinnaman Memo
(1948)] ("Belitso's outfit and Nocki's outfit claim they can't stay on Indian range in summer
- 'No watah'); Navaho Case Pictures at 6 (Nov. 17, 1950) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12,
Hatahley, No. C-36-53) (Dale H. Kinnaman describing a series of photographs: "Herder on
small burro with gun under his arm. Said the herd was owned by 'Little Wagon.' He was
'Little Wagon's' boy. He would not talk any English and very little Navaho. He carried a sharp
pencil for what, we could not find out. Ha Ha."); Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman,
Range Manager, to Reg'1 Adm'r, Div. of Range Mgmt., BLM at 2 (Apr. 5, 1951) (contained in
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, Hatahley, No. C-36-53) (describing Sakizzie and Eddie Nakai as "bold[]
and belligerent[]").
317. See, e.g., Kinnaman Memo (1948), supra note 316, at 2-3 (questioning the "apparent
poverty stricken condition of these Indians").
318. See, e.g., id. at 1.
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Let us re-examine the "context" of this lawsuit to identify evidence of the
racialized power structure that led to and shaped the litigation. We can go back
to the 1870s and the initial entry of white settlers and ranchers into the area. In
the first instance, this area, like the rest of the continent, is seen as "open" to
appropriation because the Navajos' use and occupation ofthe land is "invisible."
The Navajos' presence in the Montezuma Creek area was literally not obvious
to the white settlers for at least two reasons. First, their presence here was
historically shaped by the need to hide, both from the U.S. Army and from their
traditional enemies, the Utes, so their homesites were chosen to be non-
obvious."' In addition, their pastoral lifestyle did not make intensive or
permanent use of any particular area; they migrated seasonally with their herds,
their homes were not physically substantial, and what "fields" they cultivated
were small and unfenced.
Metaphorically, the Navajo's presence was also invisible to the incoming
whites. From the nineteenth-century-white perspective, the Navajos had been
defeated and restricted to their reservation within the decade before whites
began to claim the Montezuma Creek area as their own. The fact that some
Navajos-specifically, these Montezuma CreekNavajos-were never defeated,
rounded-up, or sent to Bosque Redondo or later to the reservation was unknown
and no doubt irrelevant to the arriving whites. Thus, when Navajos were
inevitably discovered in the area, they were labeled "trespassers" who were
"off' their reservation-even though these Navajos had never been "on" the
reservation in the first place and did not see it as "theirs."
Once Navajos were recognized as being present, their ability to lay claim to
what is, after all, the public domain was restricted. Initially, there was an
enormous language barrier, which persisted until well into the twentieth century.
When this was combined with these Navajos' lack of access to government,
either state,320 federal,321 or tribal, it was not surprising that so few Navajos filed
papers to homestead-what is surprising is that any of them did at all.322 And
eventually, even this possibility was removed. In 1933, Navajos were barred
from filing further homestead applications, a statutory ban that was patently
racially discriminatory.
319. See, e.g., Brugge, supra note 16, at 120 (noting that a sightseer from Bluff, Utah
reported seeing Navajos only twice in an area where a number were known to be living).
320. In 1957, "Utah [became] the last state to allow Indians to vote." Maryboy & Begay,
supra note 25, at 296.
321. Federal citizenship was granted in 1924. Id. at 295.
322. Not that this helped. See supra text accompanying note 155 (testimony from Jim Joe's
Daughter that she was intimidated until she left her allotment and moved onto the reservation).
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Being excluded from citizenship, and thus from access to government, meant
that the Navajos were also vulnerable to the implicit violence that is the State323
without the mediating possibility of redress through the ballot box. The
Montezuma Creek Navajos are exquisitely sensitive to the possibility of
racialized violence. Racialized violence is not the violence of the outlaw, to
which anyone is vulnerable. By racialized violence, I mean violence that
involves a white aggressor against a Native American victim and which is either
officially sanctioned or tacitly allowed. The roundup and destruction of their
horses in 1952 and 1953 is an example of the former. In 1931 and 1932, this
same group of Navajos had some seventy head of horses killed by unknown
persons, an example of the latter.324 They also had the example of By-a-lil-le3 25
and Posey3 26 as object lessons in the ever-present possibility of racialized
violence. In the months leading up to and during the roundup, the Navajos had
other examples of the implicit threat of violence. Judge Ritter commented in
323. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1610 n.22
(1986).
324. Brugge, supra note 16, at 196.
325. In 1907, an Indian agent and two cavalry troops conducted a surprise attack on the
camp ofa Navajo "troublemaker" named By-a-lil-le. Two Navajo men were killed, and another
nine were incarcerated for two years at hard labor. McPHERSON, HISTORY, supra note 37, at
130.
326. This 1923 incident, which started with the escape of two young Utes from jail and
ended with Posey's death, was called the "Posey War" or the "Last Indian Uprising." See id.
at 159-63.
327. At the second trial, there was testimony about an incident that had occurred around the
time the horses were being rounded up. A Navajo by the name of Jimmy Jelly and his family
had been at a "squaw dance" and had driven off in their auto. They were chased by at least two
white men, who shot at them, leaving fourteen bullet holes in the truck. One bullet grazed
Jelly's head, and another struck him in the leg. Second Trial Transcript, supra note 222, at 157-
59.
This was not the only such incident. See, e.g., Letter from Knox Patterson to Sheriff and
County Attorney, San Juan County, Utah (Jan. 15, 1951) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11,
Hatahley v. United States, No. C-36-53 (D. Utah Jan. 22, 1954)) (alleging that three Navajo
horses had been shot, two corrals burned, and a watering trough destroyed); Memorandum from
Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'l Adm'r, Div. of Range Mgmt., BLM at 1-2
(Sept. 10, 1951) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, Hatahley, No. C-36-53) (describing a
"fracas" at a "[s]ing" where shots were fired "into the ground" by law enforcement as a warning;
it is not clear whether this is the same ceremony where Jimmy Jelly's auto was shot); cf
Memorandum from Dale H. Kinnaman, Range Manager, BLM, to Reg'l Adm'r, BLM at 2-3
(Nov. 19, 1950) (contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12, Hatahley, No. C-36-53) (describing an
incident of "gunplay" that consisted of a Navajo man "unstrapp[ing] the lid on his holster and
put[ting] his hand on the butt of his pistol").
One reader commented that this section on the background violence seemed like a
55
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
the first trial about the "great restraint" of the Navajos in the face of intense
provocation,3 28 but they were well-schooled in the futility ofphysical resistance.
The Taylor Grazing Act provides yet another example of racialized power
structures being deployed against the Navajos. The overuse of the range was a
scientific fact, and it would be painful to all users to have to bring their use of
the range into compliance with the new restrictions-but that pain was
disproportionately shunted onto the shoulders oftheNavajos. Keep in mind that
while all users of the range, white and Navajo, had contributed to its overuse,
whites were grazing many more animals than the Navajos, both in absolute
numbers and proportionately. Yet within a very short time, the Navajos were
completely shut out of the permitting process.
Finally, when enforcement of the grazing permits began, it again fell
disproportionately on the Navajos.329 Any enforcement scheme will have areas
of discretion-highway patrolmen, for example, rarely ticket someone who is
going only one or two miles per hour over the posted speed limit, despite the fact
that the speed limit is absolute in its terms. When this discretionary "wiggle-
room" in the enforcement ofthe grazing permits is examined, it appears that this
discretion was employed in a racially discriminatory manner.
At the first trial, there was testimony that a few white men's horses had been
rounded up in addition to the Navajos' horses.3 o This testimony was brought
in to show that the roundup was not aimed at the Navajos per se, but instead was
aimed at any unauthorized use ofthe range. Yet when asked what became ofthe
whites' horses, the range manager testified that the ranchers paid $2.50 per horse
for the cost of collecting the horses 3' and that the horses were returned to
them.332 Conversely, when Little Wagon's horses were rounded up and he
persuaded the bilingual trader, Ira Hatch, to go with him to redeem them, he was
led to believe that it would cost sixty dollars per horse to redeem them-far
more than he could afford and decidedly more than what the white rancher was
asked to pay.'
stereotype of a Hollywood Western come to life, only in the wrong century. It is precisely this
aspect of the case that makes it so relevant to the history of race relations.
328. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 580.
329. "There is considerable evidence in the record to show that the Utah abandoned horse
statute was applied discriminatorily against the Indians." Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S.
173, 176 (1956).
330. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 140.
331. Id. at 98.
332. Id. at 49, 99.
333. Id. at 315. Construing the trial testimony most generously, at the very least there was
a misunderstanding about what Little Wagon was told. Hatch testified that when they asked
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Moreover, the enforcement actions were again shadowed by the implicit
threat of violence. There was testimony at the trial that members of Sakizzie's
family-four young men and one young woman-tracked the horses into
Blanding and discovered them in a corral.334 They testified that as they began
to talk with the range aide about the horses, one rancher jumped into his car
and left, shortly returning with another carload of men.335 These men got out of
their car with weapons in their hands and, according to one of the Navajos,
began playing around with the catches of their guns."' Although the range aide
testified that one of the men was just showing the others a new weapon,337 that
explanation rings hollow given all the tension surrounding the roundup. If the
arrival of the men with the weapons was meant to intimidate the Navajos, it
succeeded, as the young woman became very uncomfortable and talked the
others into leaving.338
B. Law as a Paradoxical Tool
Initially, the law was used as a tool against the Navajos. The executive orders
defining the Navajo reservation lands operated to define what land was and was
not available to the Montezuma Creek Navajos. These orders were made
without reference to the "on the ground" fact that they had been living on and
using the Montezuma Creek area for at least 150 years and that they may have
about redeeming the horses, the range aide telephoned his boss, who said that it would cost sixty
dollars per head to redeem them. Id. at 332. The range aide testified that his boss said that the
cost of redeeming a horse would be two dollars per month and that he believed the Navajos'
horses had been trespassing for two years. Id. at 414-15 (two years at two dollars per month
would equal forty-eight dollars for a single horse). There of course was never any factual
determination that Little Wagon's horses had been trespassing that long, and it is hard to believe
that could ever be proven. Little Wagon clearly believed that he was being asked to pay sixty
dollars per head, and the government tried to use his testimony to show that his horses were not
worth that much, but Hatch, the trader who accompanied him to translate, claimed that what he
said was that he did not have that much money. Id. at 340; see also Hatahley, 351 U.S. at 177.
There was another instance brought into testimony, again to show that enforcement was not
aimed exclusively at Navajos. The range manager testified that four or five Utes' horses were
rounded up. But again, as with the white ranchers, the Utes were allowed to reclaim their horses
when the Navajos were not. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 45. This difference in
treatment is no doubt a consequence of the fact that the Utes did not keep herds of livestock and
thus were not in competition with the white ranchers.
334. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 249-50.
335. Id. at 250.
336. Id. at 252.
337. Id. at 410.
338. Id. at 250-51.
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been functioning as a separate and independent band. 339 Then there were the
administrative actions under the Taylor Grazing Act shutting them out of the
permitting process. Finally, law enforcement was used to arrest them for
trespassing on lands the Montezuma Creek Navajos considered theirs, and
litigation was used to deny their claim to the land.
Then, in what still seems to me an amazing move (but maybe not, given the
Navajos' reputation for adaptability)," the Montezuma Creek Navajos picked
up the tool of the law and used it themselves. They filed lawsuits against the
white ranchers and the government. Law gave them a way to oppose what they
felt was wrong in a way that white society was compelled to recognize.
One of the many ironies of this case is the Supreme Court's characterization
of the plaintiffs as a "simple and primitive" band of Indians. 34 1 Filing a lawsuit
is not usually considered "primitive" behavior. Filing a lawsuit against the
federal government is even less so. Moreover, keep in mind that this lawsuit
was brought by individuals and not the Navajo tribe. For Native Americans,
almost all of whom spoke little or no English, to file a lawsuit against the federal
government in the early 1950s seems both a sophisticated and gutsy thing to do.
Another of the ironies in this case is that the judge involved was Willis Ritter.
Judge Ritter was a fascinating, complex, and ultimately tragic figure in Utah's
legal society. In the course of this research, I was told that, given that Hatahley
involved one of Ritter's favorites, the Navajos, suing one of his most despised
parties, the federal government, he probably was biased in his judging. My
examination of the record, however, suggests a more complicated picture.
Nevertheless, Ritter's life and philosophy predisposed him to be sympathetic to
the Navajos' case, and at the time this would not have been true of many other
judges.
Now, we could debate whether that use of the tool was successful. On the
side of "success," no one was killed, the government was found liable, and the
Montezuma Creek Navajos did get some money back to compensate them for
the loss of their animals. On the side of a "draw," the lawsuit was ultimately
settled and, according to some, nothing changed as a result of the lawsuit. On
the side of "not successful," what they really wanted was the land, and they did
not get that through the litigation.
339. See, e.g., id. at 257.
340. See, e.g., MCPHERSON,NAVAJO LAND, supra note 43, at 65-66. "Historically, the Dind
have selectively adopted new ideas and technologies that fit their beliefs and physical needs."
Id. at 85.
341. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 174 (1956).
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The Navajos' complaint sought an adjudication that they had aboriginal rights
to the disputed rangeland. There was testimony at the first trial that the eight
families had always lived off the reservation.3 2 Nevertheless, the issue of the
right to access the land mostly disappears from the record, and the reason is
hinted at in the following exchange. Milton Oman, the plaintiffs' attorney,
reminded the court that he had taken over the case after their original attorney,
Knox Patterson, died:
If the Court please, I have done what I could to find out what I could
about these ancestral rights from the balance of the witnesses, the
plaintiffs who are here....
... I appreciate your Honor's interest in this other matter, but I am
sure you know how much work it is to get into that question, and it
was not one for which I was prepared when I came into this action,
having restricted it to a claim in tort for the taking of the horses.343
In some ways this is a very sad exchange, as Oman in essence admits that he had
to drop any claim for rights to the land in order to focus on the federal tort claim.
It is, however, unlikely that the land claims would have been resolved in the
process of deciding this case, as all Indian land claims were to be resolved
through the Indian Claims Commission (ICC). 3" Nevertheless, I think this
lawsuit had a long-lasting impact on the plaintiffs in three ways.
First, they did get some of the land, although not through the lawsuit. In
1959, with plans for Glen Canyon Dam and the filling of its reservoir going
forward, the federal government negotiated the transfer of land to the Navajo
Reservation in compensation for the reservation land that was going to be
submerged under Lake Powell.3 45 Although I have not (yet) found the smoking
gun, I do not think it was merely coincidental that the public land transferred to
the reservation was McCracken Mesa, which was at the heart of the Montezuma
Creek Navajos' grazing disputes. In other words, I think the squeaky wheel got
the grease. Ironically, Ritter had made the suggestion of extending the
reservation to include the disputed area in the course of the very first trial in
1953. 4
342. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 325-27.
343. Id. at 361.
344. See, e.g., id. at 258. See generally MICHAEL LIEDER&JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE: THE
PEOPLE OF GERONIMO VS. THE UNITED STATES 59-68 (1997); H.D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN
COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION (1990).
345. Maryboy & Begay, supra note 25, at 301.
346. "The next natural extension [of the reservation] I should suppose would be right where
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Second, I think the experience of bringing the lawsuit "raised the
consciousness" of this band. Many of the same plaintiffs, such as Eddie Nakai
and Sakizzie, testified in the ICC proceedings that would decide that Navajos
had indeed been deprived of land without just compensation.3 47 And since then
several lawsuits have been brought by this band, continuing to this day: to
compel an accounting for the oil and gas revenues collected for their benefit
from the Aneth oil field; to compel the county to allocate resources for schools
and medical care; and for representation on jury panels.348
Finally, I suspect the lawsuit stepped up the pace of what was probably
inevitable: the Navajos' move from reliance on livestock to vehicles. For
example, in the Fruitland, Utah area in 1949, there were ten motor vehicles; by
1952, there where 150; by the mid-1960s, almost every camp had at least one
vehicle.349 Here is an anecdote that highlights this: Sakizzie used the money he
received in the litigation not to replace his horses, but to buy a tractor.5 o
IV Of Prejudice and Partiality
There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to
call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to
thought and action. Judges cannot escape that current any more
than other mortals.... We may try to see things as objectively as we
please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except
our own. 35'
My interest in the Hatahley case was sparked by a passage in the Tenth
Circuit's second opinion in which the court strongly implied that the trial
judge was prejudiced in favor of the Navajos.352 This seemed to me such an
these folks are living. . . ." First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 268-69.
347. See J. Lee Correll, Navajo Frontiers in Utah and Troublous Times in Monument Valley,
39 UTAH HIST. Q. 145, 147 n.6 (1971) (referring to testimony before the ICC by Tse K'izzi and
Eddie Nakai).
348. See, e.g., Sakezzie v. Utah Indian Affairs Comm'n, 198 F. Supp. 218 (D. Utah 1961)
(regarding royalties from oil production on Navajo lands); see also Pioneer Hosteen Sakizzie
Dies at 101, NAVAJO TIMES (Window Rock, Ariz.), Sept. 28, 1972, at A-14 (Northern Navajo
Fair edition) (stating that Sakizzie had testified in the horse case, the land case, and the oil case).
349. MCPHERSON, NAvAJO LAND, supra note 43, at 95.
350. Pioneer Hosteen Sakizzie Dies at 101, supra note 348, at A-14.
351. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOzo, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 140-41 (1976) (quoting BENJAMIN
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)).
352. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley l), 257 F.2d 920, 925-26 (10th Cir. 1958).
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unlikely situation that I felt compelled to investigate further. Not surprisingly,
I discovered that the question of judicial partiality in this case was far from
simple.
Our legal system is premised on the ideal of the disinterested decision-
maker: the popular conception of Justice is that of a blindfolded woman
holding up the scales ofjustice.as Certainly the idea that ajudge should have
no financial interest in the outcome of a case is a sound one, as is the idea that
ajudge should recuse himself or herself if there is a close personal connection
to the subject matter of the lawsuit or to one of its participants. But beyond
that, the concept of judicial impartiality becomes problematic.
Today, the idea of complete judicial impartiality seems somewhat naive,
although first-year law students are often taken aback at the suggestion that
judges might be predisposed to rule in favor of one party or the other for
reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the case. It has long been
acknowledged that "judicial decisions . .. are at least partially attributable to
the personal values and experiences of the judges."354 A recent empirical
study confirmed that "extra-legal factors" played a part in judicial decisions.5 s
The current debate focuses on the extent to which judges are so influenced
and whether the idea of judicial impartiality should be considered a myth
created to legitimate judicial power or an aspiration to which judges should
strive even though they may not achieve it.
In Hatahley, the issue ofjudicial impartiality assumed critical importance;
in fact, I would argue that it determined the eventual outcome of the case. In
this section I begin by examining Judge Ritter's personal background and his
path to the judiciary, which was fraught with controversy. Then I closely
examine the Tenth Circuit's justification for removing Ritter from the
Hatahley case and conclude that it is wanting.
353. "Under the traditional view of our judicial system, judges are supposed to be perfectly
impartial and objective in making decisions, unaffected by personal values or their
backgrounds." Gregory C. Sisk, Judges Are Human, Too, 83 JUDICATURE 178, 178 (2000).
354. Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 1551, 1552 (1966).
355. Sisk, supra note 353, at 179 (citing Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377 (1998)).
Although the study identified a number of factors that were statistically significant in predicting
judicial decisions, it also confirmed that, in accord with the prevailing model of the rule of law,
judges are indeed influenced by precedent. Id.
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A. Judge Ritter's Background
At the time the complaint was filed in March 1953, there was but one
federal judge sitting in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. His
name was Willis William Ritter, and he was only the third federal judge
appointed for the District of Utah.3s6
Ritter was the first federal judge for the District of Utah to have been born
and raised in Utah, although his family was not Mormon.357 He was born on
January 24, 1899 in Salt Lake City.ss The first few years of his life were
spent in Silver City, in the Tintic Mining District in Juab County in central
Utah, where his father was mining quartz.' In 1903, his family moved to a
small town eight miles outside of Park City to run a hot-springs resort that had
been left to his father.360 When Ritter was seven, his parents moved to Park
City.36' His father worked in the silver mines, and his mother supplemented
the family income by working as a nurse and midwife.3 62 Despite the fact that
he would go on to become a member of a privileged profession, Ritter would
identify with the working man his entire life.
Ritter's parents divorced when he was in his teens. 63 His mother remarried
and moved out-of-state, taking Ritter's three younger siblings with her.3*
Ritter moved in with his mother's sister and her husband, after whom he had
been named and who was a noted photographer.3 s6
After high school66 and a stint in the mines and another in the Army, Ritter
356. The first federal judge appointed for the state of Utah (as opposed to Utah Territory)
was John A. Marshall, a grand-nephew of the famous Chief Justice John Marshall. He was
appointed when Utah became a state in 1896 and served until August 1915. He was followed
by Tillman Johnson, who was appointed in 1915 and served until 1949. Tenth Judicial Circuit
Historical Society, The Lore of Chief Judge Willis W. Ritter: The Good, the Bad & the
Unbelievable 3 (Apr. 17, 2007) (unpublished handout from Continuing Legal Education
presentation, on file with the American Indian Law Review).
357. CowLEY & NIELSON, supra note 312, at 2.
358. Id. at 9.
359. Id. at 8-9.
360. Id. at 9-10.
361. Id at 14.
362. Id at 16.
363. Id. at 20.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 22.
366. In an ironic coincidence, one of Ritter's classmates at Park High School (out of a class
of eighteen) was Roger Traynor, the future Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court.
Apparently, Ritter never quite got over the fact that Traynor was valedictorian to Ritter's
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attended the Valparaiso University School of Law for one year and then the
University of Utah for another year.3 67 He finished his legal training at the
University of Chicago, where he graduated with an LL.B degree cum laude
and was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1924."' He practiced as a tax attorney
for two years in Washington, D.C. and then was recruited to teach at the
University of Utah College of Law, where he remained for nearly twenty
years. 6
Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Ritter was
recruited into the Office of Price Administration (OPA), first as rent director
in Salt Lake City and later as regional rent executive based in Denver,
Colorado. 370 He served with OPA until early 1944, at which point he returned
to Salt Lake City and resumed private practice. 7
Ritter's path to the judiciary began in 1932 when he became active in
politics as a Democrat, campaigning for the election of Elbert Thomas for
United States Senator.372 In early 1944, Ritter confided to a friend that
Senator Thomas had promised the federal judgeship to him-one of the
reasons he quit the OPA and returned to Utah was so he could best be
positioned for the judgeship. 7' The federal judge for the District of Utah at
the time, Tillman Johnson, was eighty-six years old, and his retirement was
widely thought to be imminent.37 4 Judge Johnson, however, did not formally
announce his retirement until June 1949.7
In August 1949, President Truman nominated Ritter to replace Tillman
Johnson on the bench. In the meantime, though, several things had occurred
that made Ritter's appointment more controversial than it would have been in
1944. First, and perhaps most important, was that the LDS Church had
abandoned its policy of political neutrality and had begun endorsing political
candidates, mostly Republicans."' At the same time, Republicans nationally
had begun to raise the "bogeyman" of Communism in political campaigns."
salutatorian at their graduation. Id. at 21.
367. Id. at 27.
368. Id. at 28.
369. Id. at 29-30, 59, 64.
370. Id. at 59.
371. Id. at 62, 64.
372. Id. at 47.
373. Id. at 62.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 109.
376. Id. at 76.
377. Id. at 77.
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Thus, political forces in Utah were arrayed against Ritter based on his being
a New Deal Democrat and a non-Mormon.7
Moreover, some ofRitter's personal qualities were creating questions about
his suitability as well. Some of his friends had noticed a change in his
temperament dating from the two years he spent in the OPA during World
War II.' His stint as an administrator was the first time in his public life that
Ritter had been the center of controversy.so It was during this time that
accusations of arrogance and high-handedness were first leveled against
him."' During this same period, rumors of his womanizing also began.382
The controversy surrounding the nomination and appointment of Ritter
reveals that the politicalization of the judiciary predates the era of Clarence
Thomas and Robert Bork. Arthur V. Watkins, the junior senator from Utah
and a Republican, spearheaded the campaign against Ritter. Probably
realizing he lacked the political clout to oppose Ritter's nomination
successfully, he deployed a strategy of delay. At the hearing on Ritter's
nomination before the subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Watkins pointed out that the committee had received two negative letters (out
of several hundred supportive letters) and requested that the subcommittee
hold public hearings in Salt Lake City."
Ironically, one of the negative letters came from Knox Patterson,384 who
would file the Hatahley case on behalf of the Navajo plaintiffs. In his letter,
Patterson repeated rumors concerning Ritter's arbitrariness at the OPA and
then made the accusation that "Ritter does not believe in the Constitution of
the United States; . . . he believes it is outmoded and obstructs social
progress."" In a subsequent letter to the Salt Lake Tribune, Patterson
revealed that the source of this accusation was a 1936 lecture series that Ritter
378. "Many said that he disliked Mormons. The truth is probably that he resented those who
wielded and abused power, which in Utah was centered in the Mormon Church .... " Id. at 2.
379. Id. at 86.
380. The controversy arose from an OPA regulation requiring owners of motor courts to
establish monthly rental fees for long-time residents, as opposed to the higher daily fees. This
was an unpopular regulation and Ritter bore the brunt of the public disapproval, although he
was charged with administering the policy and had nothing to do with its being adopted. Id. at
60-62.
381. Id. at 60.
382. Id. at 96.
383. Id. at 118-19.
384. Id. at 117.
385. Id. at 118.
64 [Vol. 34
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss1/1
No. 1] HATAHLEY: A LEGAL ARCHAEOLOGY CASE STUDY
had given on the U.S. Supreme Court.38 6 He also stated, "I made no specific
charges of disloyalty." 38 7
In the lectures and letters, Ritter had articulated a view of the Constitution
that allowed for its flexible interpretation .3  From today's vantage point,
where debates about the "original intent" of the framers versus the
Constitution as a "living document" are common, this seems like a tempest in
a teapot. But in the red-baiting atmosphere of those times, which would soon
blossom into full-fledged McCarthyism, a charge of not believing in the
Constitution was tantamount to accusing someone of being a Communist.
On October 13, 1949, the subcommittee voted to approve Ritter's
nomination, but Republican pressure delayed action by the full Judiciary
Committee before the end of the session.389 President Truman appointed
Ritter temporarily in a recess appointment on October 21, 1949.390
In January 1950, when Congress reconvened and Ritter's appointment
again came under scrutiny, the controversy moved into the press and became
increasingly ugly.39' Watkins continued to press for public hearings, and
ultimately two were held, one in Salt Lake City and one in Denver, where
Ritter had been working with the OPA. The process raised a lot of smoke, but
little fire. In the last analysis, none of the accusations against Ritter were
substantiated.39 2 On June 29, 1950, Ritter's appointment finally was voted
386. Id. at 121.
387. Id.
388. "'There are terms in the Constitution which are absolute, but there are other terms, and
they are by far the more important, which are flexible, which are relative .... It is a live, vital
instrument, flexible and adaptable enough to change and accommodate itself... to our changing
needs and conditions."' Id. at 52-53 (quoting Ritter's lecture notes).
389. Id. at 135-36.
390. Id. at 137.
391. See, e.g., Katherine Johnsen, Watkins Fights Shielding Ritter, DESERET NEWS (Salt
Lake City), Mar. 14, 1950, at Al ("[Watkins says there have been] questions raised about
[Ritter's] character, his integrity, and morals. . . ."); Frank Hewlett, Thomas Offers List of91
to Press Ritter Okeh, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 7, 1950, at 25 ("Sen. Thomas enumerated 13
charges which have been spoken or intimated against Judge Ritter, ranging from disbelief in the
U.S. constitution to engaging in unethical legal practices to questionable private conduct and
personal life.").
392. There is an irony here, and a mystery. The accusations that Ritter had an affair with a
secretary in Albuquerque were not proven-but Ritter's wife and daughter apparently believed
there was something to it, and subsequently Ritter was unfaithful. We are left to wonder
whether the accusations were correct even though unproven, or whether they became a sort of
self-fulfilling prophecy. Similarly, the accusations that Ritter had a drinking problem were
denied by witnesses supporting his appointment, but in later years Ritter indisputably suffered
from alcoholism. See, e.g., COWLEY & NIELSON, supra note 312, at 254-55. Again, failure of
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upon and confirmed by the Senate.' Controversy would continue to follow
him throughout his career. 4
B. The Tenth Circuit's Charge of Bias
The Tenth Circuit was convinced that Ritter was not functioning as an
impartial decisionmaker. In its second opinion, the Tenth Circuit described
Ritter's behavior during the two trials as follows:
A casual reading of the two records leaves no room for doubt that
the District Judge was incensed and embittered, perhaps
understandably so, by the general treatment over a period of years
of the plaintiffs and other Indians in southeastern Utah by the
government agents and white ranchers in their attempt to force the
Indians onto established reservations. This was climaxed by the
range clearance program, with instances of brutal handling and
slaughter of their livestock .... The Court firmly believed that the
Indians were being wrongfully driven from their ancestral homes,
and suggested Presidential and Congressional investigations to
determine their aboriginal rights. He threatened to conduct such an
investigation himself. A public appeal on behalf of the plaintiffs
was made for funds and supplies to be cleared through the Judge's
proof at the time, or self-fulfilling prophecy?
393. Id. at 156-58.
394. When I arrived in Salt Lake City in 1986, I soon was hearing stories, perhaps
apocryphal, about Ritter. The stories were always colorful, sometimes uncomplimentary. Here
is a recent example of the type of stories still told about him:
Don Carlos Wells might be wondering: Where is Judge Willis Ritter when
you really need him? ... Wells challenged a parking ticket he received in Provo
on constitutional grounds.... He was basically laughed out of the Provo Justice
Court .... If only he could have had that problem 30 years ago, when the
eccentric federal Judge Willis Ritter reigned over the federal court in Salt Lake
City like Caesar on steroids.
When a University of Utah student during the 1970s filed a pro se motion
with Ritter asking that parking tickets be ruled unconstitutional because the
defendant was not allowed to face the accuser, Ritter issued a temporary
restraining order on parking tickets in Salt Lake City.
It took the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals one day to overturn Ritter, but
not before the city was awash in illegally parked autos ....
Paul Rolly, Rolly: Utahn Not 'Celebrity'Material, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 12, 2008 (second
item in article), available in LEXIS, News & Business Library, Salt Lake Tribune file. See
generally William T. Thurman, Sr., Vignettes of the Late ChiefJudge Willis W Ritter, UTAH
B.J., Dec. 1994, at 12, 12.
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chambers. From his obvious interest in the case, illustrated by
conduct and statements made throughout the trial, . . . we are
certain that the feeling of the presiding Judge is such that, upon
retrial, he cannot give the calm, impartial consideration which is
necessary for a fair disposition of this unfortunate matter, and he
should step aside."
My examination of the record, however, suggests a more complicated picture
than the Tenth Circuit's opinion would suggest. It is accurate to say that
Ritter was often harsh with the government's attorneys and particularly its
witnesses.396 At the same time, however, he was often harsh with the
plaintiffs' attorney as well. 97
To understand Ritter's role in this litigation it is important to know several
things about him. To begin with, he was intelligent and inquisitive. During
cases, he would often get a book about the subject matter of the case and read
up on it.398 This occurred during the Hatahley case, during which he read a
book on the Long Walk and Bosque Redondo and lectured the attorneys on the
subject in a monologue captured on the record.'99 Like many brilliant
individuals, he did not suffer fools gladly. At times during the trial, he would
become frustrated with what he thought was incompetent questioning of
witnesses, and he would take over the examination, grilling the witness with
a series of succinct, pointed questions.
As noted above, the appointment process for his judgeship was incredibly
partisan and vitriolic, which left him with a lifelong bitterness he was never
able to get past.4 00 Finally, he had problems with alcohol. His impatience and
395. United States v. Hatabley (Hatahley ll), 257 F.2d 920, 925-26 (10th Cir. 1958).
396. E.g., First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 69 (Ritter warns a witness that the "penalty
of perjury [is] hanging over you"); id at 556-57 (Ritter expels government witness from the
courtroom for laughing).
397. Id. at 163 (Ritter tells plaintiffs' attorney he cannot have as much time to try the case
as requested).
398. Personal Conversation with James Holbrook, Former Law Clerk to Judge Ritter, in Salt
Lake City, Utah (Apr. 2003).
399. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 348-53.
400. "Emotionally, [the confirmation process] was like a cancer that metastasized over the
next 28 years and affected almost every action he took." Bruce S. Jenkins, Hon. Willis W.
Ritter: Lessons Learnedfrom the Principles, Practices, and Personality of Utah's First Chief
US. District Judge, FED. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 26, 28.
The attacks against Ritter during the appointment process were often ad hominem and
included allegations, never substantiated, of adultery nearly a decade earlier. Ritter perceived
the public and personal attacks as contributing to the unraveling of his marriage. Although they
were never divorced, his wife took up a separate residence after his appointment.
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bitterness, which were both aggravated by his drinking, led to Ritter being the
classic "loose cannon" in the courtroom.
But it is an interesting question whether Ritter was in fact biased in favor
of the Navajos, as the government and the Tenth Circuit claimed. Without
question, Ritter's sympathies were consistently with the underdog, in large
part because he was a perpetual outsider.401' Also without question, he had a
fondness for Navajo culture, having seriously collected Navajo rugs since the
193 Os. 402
As part of a project for the Department of Commerce in the early 1930s, he
researched the commercial potential of Navajo art.403 A neighbor, learning of
his interest, offered to sell him a collection of Navajo weavings and baskets,
which became the nucleus of his own collection.404 His collection became
valuable enough that when in the 1970s he donated a portion of the collection
to the Utah Museum of Fine Arts, it was worth about $67,000.405 In all, he
made three separate donations to the Museum, and shortly after his death the
Museum curated an exhibit, "The Navajo Weaver: The Judge Willis W. Ritter
Collection," which contained over 130 items.4 06
But "prejudice" involves more than a leaning or a predisposition. If not, no
judge could ever sit in judgment, as everyone sees the world from his or her
own perspective.40 7 In fact, most judges, being members of a professional
class, lead lives of relative privilege. The tendency for members of a
privileged class to view conflicts from the perspective of that class is one of
the "societal structures of power" that attention to context is meant to
highlight.408
It is also significant for this case that the U.S. Attorney for Utah who represented the
defendant, A. Pratt Kesler, had prior to his appointment to that office been a player in the
opposition to Ritter's appointment.
401. The sources of his outsider status were many, and included being orphaned, being a
non-Mormon in Utah, being a Westerner at his midwestern college, and being a Democrat in
an increasingly Republican state.
402. By the end of his life he had amassed a sizeable and valuable collection, which he
donated to the University of Utah. COWLEY &NIELSON, supra note 312, at 300-01.
403. Id. at 35.
404. Id.
405. In 1974, Ritter made a gift of Navajo weavings to the Utah Museum of Fine Arts that
was appraised at $45,000. Judge Willis Ritter Papers, Special Collections, Marriott Library,
University of Utah, Box 207, Folder 8. A year later, he made another gift that was appraised
at almost $23,000. Id. at Folder 9.
406. COWLEY&NIELSON, supra note 312, at 301.
407. See supra text accompanying note 351.
408. Minow & Spelman, supra note 3, at 1605.
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So the question is, was Ritter prejudiced in favor of the Navajos? Or in a
social context that at the very least was stacked against the Navajos and at the
worst was racially biased against them, did Ritter's attention to context come
across as partiality? In other words, if everyone else is prejudiced against a
group and one person is not, that person would very likely appear to be
prejudiced in favor of the group because he or she would stand out from the
generalized background bias.409
As discussed at the beginning of this article, the call in law to put
something in context is best understood as a call to pay attention to social
power structures."o Ritter was very conscious of all the ways in which the
Navajo plaintiffs stood outside of these structures. One way to read the Tenth
Circuit's opinion is as a rejection of Ritter's contextualizing the Navajo's
situation.
The Tenth Circuit adopted what today would be called a "color-blind"
approach to the case:
Plaintiffs' claims are asserted under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. In applying this Act, everyone should be treated the same.
Racial differences merit no concern. Feelings of charity or
ideological sympathy for the Indians must be put to one side. The
deep concern which the executive and legislative branches of the
government should have for the plaintiffs does not justify the court
in giving them any better or worse treatment than would be given
to anyone else. As Justice Jackson said in his concurring opinion
in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324
U.S. 335, 355 . . . : "The Indian problem is essentially a
sociological problem, not a legal one. We can make only a
pretense of adjudication of such claims, and that only by indulging
the most unrealistic and fictional assumptions."11
This is really a most extraordinary passage and worth parsing in some detail.
Racial differences merit no concern.412
It is somewhat ambiguous whether the court is saying racial differences
merit no concern under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which would be a narrow
409. Consider the epithet of "n*****-lover" that was hurled at civil-rights activists.
410. See supra note 3.
411. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley II), 257 F.2d 920, 926 (10th Cir. 1958).
412. Id.
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reading of this passage, or that they merit no concern legally, in a more
general sense. Even taking the more narrow reading, this is a point of
fundamental difference between the Tenth Circuit and Ritter.
Ritter would have no doubt said that this entire case is the result of racial
differences, and so of course they should merit concern. 413 He might have
even gone so far as to say in this case race merited concern especially under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.414 As the Tenth Circuit hinted in the quoted
passage, the federal government stands in a special relationship to members
of federally recognized tribes.415 The relationship is of a fiduciary nature; the
tribes are wards of the federal government. Ritter refers to this relationship
during the first trial.416 A reasonable person could infer that this special
relationship should matter under the Federal Tort Claims Act, just as a
fiduciary relationship matters under common-law tort principles.417
Ironically, Ritter agreed with the quote from Justice Jackson that
characterized the Indian problem as "essentially a sociological problem, not
a legal one." Ritter was acutely conscious of the limitations of any legal
remedy available in this litigation: "In the final analysis nothing that I can do
here will solve [the problem of how these Navajo are to survive].""s Indeed,
the limited legal remedy available is one of the reasons he called for
congressional action.419
It also seems a trifle unfair of the Tenth Circuit to imply that Ritter was
unable to put "[fleelings of charity or ideological sympathy for the Indians ...
413. "Another type of silence that warrants more attention is that which stems from the
apparent desire of decision makers to ignore the racial element of a controversy even when that
element is, in fact, a major presence in the controversy." Kennedy, supra note 9, at 220.
414. To some extent I am of course putting words in Ritter's mouth, but the position I
attribute to him is supported by comments he made during the trials. See, e.g., First Trial
Transcript, supra note 18, at 263-64, 274-75 (Ritter notes that the government stands in the
position of guardian to the Navajos but is not acting as one).
415. Patterson, the plaintiffs' original attorney, had argued that this band of Navajos should
not be considered part of the Navajo Tribe, which would mean that they were not wards of the
government. Of course, he was also probably preparing to argue that they should be recognized
as a separate and independent band by the federal government, which would then continue the
trust relationship.
416. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 263.
417. E.g., McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140, 163 (1935) (noting that "a tort growing out
of the [fraud] by men chargeable as trustees" is "something more" than an ordinary tort). The
Court warned, in language arguably applicable to this case: "Confusion of thought is inevitable
unless the position of the wrongdoers as trustees is steadily kept in mind." Id.
418. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 272.
419. Id. at 273.
70 [Vol. 34
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss1/1
No. 1] HATAHLEY: A LEGAL ARCHAEOLOGY CASE STUDY
to one side."420 In both the Hatahley and Tse-Kisi cases, Ritter made it very
clear that, while he understood that the controversy at heart was about access
to land and that he was outraged by the history of forced dispossession that
culminated in these cases, his sympathetic feelings were irrelevant when it
came to awarding any legal right to the land.4 2'
Another characterization of what was going on in Ritter's courtroom was
that he was not so much prejudiced in favor of the Navajos as he was
prejudiced against the federal government and the U.S. Attorney's office in
particular. At the time the case was filed, Pratt Kesler was the U.S. Attorney
for Utah. Kesler, as Utah state chairman of the Republican Party, had been a
prominent player in the 1950 defeat of the Democratic Senator Thomas,
Ritter's mentor.422 The campaign had been particularly brutal, including
charges that Thomas was a "fellow traveler" and communist sympathizer.423
Thomas died two-and-a-half years later; Ritter was convinced he died of a
broken heart.424 Kesler was later appointed Assistant U.S. Attorney as a
reward for his contributions to the Republican victory in 1950,425 and Ritter
remained bitter toward him. Kesler recounts one conversation with Ritter in
which Ritter accused Kesler of killing his best friend, Senator Thomas.426
This interpretation is given further credence by the fact that, at the time of
Ritter's death, the Justice Department was seeking to have Ritter prohibited
from hearing any cases involving the federal government.427 In Hatahley,
however, the Tenth Circuit did not characterize Ritter as being biased against
the government, perhaps because a pro-Indian bias was an easier case to sell
politically. Given the western support for states' rights and general
ambivalence about the federal government, a charge that Ritter was "anti-
federal" could backfire and create support for Ritter.
Finally, a case could be made that Ritter's "loose cannon" tendencies
undermined the perception of rationality that we expect of judicial officers.
420. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley ll), 257 F.2d 920,926 (10th Cir. 1958).
421. E.g., First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 578.
422. COWLEY & NIELSON, supra note 312, at 165.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 167.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 168.
427. Id. at 299. In 1976, the government had successfully brought a mandamus proceeding
resulting in the Tenth Circuit disqualifying Ritter from continuing to hear a criminal antitrust
prosecution. United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976). In its opinion, the Tenth
Circuit recounts the proceedings leading up to Ritter's disqualification in Hatahley, with an
emphasis this time on his anti-government slant rather than any pro-Navajo slant. Id. at 464.
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But this begs the question why Ritter's lack of judicial temperament should
be held against the Navajos.
The Tenth Circuit makes a questionable argument to justify its conclusion
that Ritter was biased in favor of the Navajos. In its opinion, written after the
second trial, the court purports to find examples of bias in the transcripts of
both trials. However, all of the specific examples the court gives come from
the first trial: the suggestion of presidential and congressional
investigations;428 the threat to conduct such an investigation himself;429 and the
public appeal for funds and supplies for the plaintiffs, to be cleared through
his chambers. 430 But it is problematic for the Tenth Circuit to rely upon
instances from the first trial to justify taking the case away from Ritter.
The question of Ritter's partiality toward the Navajos had been raised by
the government in the first appeal from the case. In its opinion from the first
appeal the Tenth Circuit had this to say:
While the record discloses that the case was tried in an atmosphere
of maximum emotion and a minimum of judicial impartiality, and
that the amount of the judgment appears to be more for punishment
because of the methods used in eliminating the animals, rather than
for the damages suffered, we shall not discuss these questions as
we have concluded that the case should be [dismissed] . . . .43
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. While noting that there was often
more heat than light in the court proceedings, the Court concluded that the
trial had been fair enough:
[The Government charges] that the trial was conducted in such an
atmosphere of bias and prejudice that no factual conclusions of the
court should be relied on.... After oral argument and a thorough
consideration of the record, however, we do not find that the trial
was conducted so improperly as to vitiate these findings.432
428. First Trial Transcript, supra note 18, at 273.
429. Id. at 579-80.
430. Id. at 360, 366.
431. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley 1), 220 F.2d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 1955), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
432. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 177 n.3 (1956). My reading of the transcript
of the first trial concurs with the Supreme Court's opinion. As has been discussed, there are
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A comparison of the two transcripts reveals that Ritter was much more
circumspect in his conduct of the second trial than he had been at the first
trial. Standing on its own, the transcript of the second trial would not, in my
opinion, justify taking the case away from Ritter. I suspect the Tenth Circuit
felt the same and thus felt compelled to rely on Ritter's conduct in the first
trial, despite the fact that the Supreme Court had rejected the argument that
Ritter had been biased in the first trial.
Epilogue: Echoes from the Past
Real justice for these Indians may still lie in the distant future; it
may never come at all.433
In one of the many ways that United States v. Hatahley continues to
resonate fifty years after it was litigated, we have recently seen another judge
removed from a case involving Indian rights because of alleged bias. In
another long-running case, Cobell v. Babbitt (Cobell V),4 an estimated
300,000 beneficiaries in Individual Indian Money trust accounts brought a
class action in 1996 against the United States alleging a breach of fiduciary
duty through mismanagement of the accounts. In 2001, the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the United States
breached its fiduciary duty to manage the trust accounts. 4 35 Just as in
Hatahley, however, the finding of liability on the part of the federal
government for misconduct toward its wards did not bring the litigation to a
close.
After eight appeals in five years, each time resulting in reversal (or similar
action) of the district court's order, the court of appeals ordered the case be
assigned to anotherjudge.3 6 In part, the appellate courtjustified this order by
the pattern of repeated reversals, but the court also relied on language in an
433. Cobell v. Norton (CobellXV), 229 F.R.D. 5,23 (D.D.C. 2005) (Lamberth, J.), vacated
sub nom. Cobell v. Kempthome (CobellXIX), 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
434. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'dsub nom. Cobell v. Norton (Cobell VI), 240 F.3d
1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). On December 7, 2009, the parties entered into a settlement agreement
pursuant to which the federal government would put more than three billion dollars into trust
accounts for the plaintiffs. See Settlement Agreement Reached in Cobell v. Salazar,
http://www.cobellsettlement.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2010). The agreement, however, is
contingent upon enabling legislation being enacted. As of April 1, 2010, that legislation had
not yet been enacted.
435. Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1110.
436. CobellXff, 455 F.3d at 319-20, 330, vacating CobellXV, 229 F.R.D. 5.
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opinion issued by the district court.437 The court of appeals quoted extensively
from the district judge's opinion, and it is worth repeating the district judge's
language here:
At times, it seems that the parties, particularly Interior, lose
sight of what this case is really about. The case is nearly a decade
old, the docket sheet contains over 3000 entries, and the issues are
such that the parties are engaged in perpetual, heated litigation on
several fronts simultaneously. But when one strips away the
convoluted statutes, the technical legal complexities, the elaborate
collateral proceedings, and the layers upon layers of interrelated
orders and opinions from this Court and the Court of Appeals,
what remains is the raw, shocking, humiliating truth at the bottom:
After all these years, our government still treats Native American
Indians as if they were somehow less than deserving of the respect
that should be afforded to everyone in a society where all people
are supposed to be equal.
For those harboring hope that the stories of murder,
dispossession, forced marches, assimilationist policy programs,
and other incidents of cultural genocide against the Indians are
merely the echoes of a horrible, bigoted government-past that has
been sanitized by the good deeds of more recent history, this case
serves as an appalling reminder of the evils that result when large
numbers of the politically powerless are placed at the mercy of
institutions engendered and controlled by a politically powerful
few. It reminds us that even today our great democratic enterprise
remains unfinished. And it reminds us, finally, that the terrible
power of government, and the frailty of the restraints on the
exercise of that power, are never fully revealed until government
turns against the people.
The Indians who brought this case are beneficiaries of a land
trust created and maintained by the government. The Departments
of the Interior and Treasury, as the government's Trustee-
Delegates, were entrusted more than a century ago with both
stewardship of the lands placed in trust and management and
distribution of the revenue generated from those lands for the
benefit of the Indians. Of course, it is unlikely that those who
concocted the idea of this trust had the Indians' best interests at
437. Id. at 325.
[Vol. 3474
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol34/iss1/1
No. 1] HATAHLEY: A LEGAL ARCHAEOLOGY CASE STUDY
heart .... But regardless of the motivations of the originators of
the trust, one would expect, or at least hope, that the modern
Interior department and its modern administrators would manage
it in a way that reflects our modern understandings of how the
government should treat people. Alas, our "modern" Interior
department has time and again demonstrated that it is a
dinosaur-the morally and culturally oblivious hand-me-down of
a disgracefully racist and imperialist government that should have
been buried a century ago, the last pathetic outpost of the
indifference and anglocentrism we thought we had left behind.438
The parallels behind this rhetoric and many of Ritter's comments during the
two Hatahley trials are inescapable, including acknowledgment of the
shadows cast by a racist and imperialist past and suggestions of current racial
animus. Unlike Ritter, the liberal and populist Democrat whose comments
were discounted as being driven by "ideological sympath[ies],"43 9 the judge
who wrote the language quoted above, Royce C. Lamberth, is a conservative
Republican, appointed to the bench under President Reagan and appointed
Presiding Judge of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in 1995
by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist.44 0 It gives one pause to see two such
disparate jurists, separated by fifty years, become enraged at the government's
treatment of Indians, a rage that transcends ideological divisions and
overcomes judicial reticence.
438. CobellXV, 229 F.R.D. at 7, vacated, Cobell XIX, 455 F.3d 317.
439. United States v. Hatahley (Hatahley II), 257 F.2d 920, 926 (10th Cir. 1958).
440. Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth, http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/lamberth-bio.htnl (last
visited Jan. 27, 2010).
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